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State generic substitution laws permit, and sometimes
require, a pharmacist to ignore the instructions on a
prescription written by a physician. When the prescriber
specifies a particular company’s product, using the product’s
brand name, these state laws direct the pharmacist to
dispense a less expensive but equivalent product made by
another company. The brand name, however, is a trademark.
Like other trademarks, drug trademarks distinguish goods in
the market from others and signal the source of the goods. As
soon as generic drugs are available, however, state law
instructs the pharmacist to read the brand name—written by
the doctor—as an instruction to dispense a different
company's product. This is the opposite of how trademarks
are supposed to operate. This Article shows that the generic
drug substitution laws of the 1970s are an anomaly in our
legal system. Substitution at the pharmacy was illegal, and
it still is otherwise illegal. The substitution laws created an
exception in pharmacy law and broke with long-standing
policy in food and drug law as well as unfair competition law.
These laws were intended to, and did, undermine proprietary
(trademark) rights to achieve savings for payors after efforts
to mandate generic prescribing failed. And they prioritized
short-term cost savings over the dynamic pro-competitive
benefits of a properly functioning trademark system.
However, much has changed since the 1970s. The regulatory
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framework has changed, regulatory science has evolved, drug
research and development has evolved, the industries have
changed, the healthcare finance system is utterly different,
and the relationship among parties in healthcare delivery has
evolved.
Policymakers should consider whether the
assumptions that supported these laws remain true today.
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INTRODUCTION
If you walk into a gas station or a fast-food restaurant with a soda
fountain today and ask for Coke, you will receive the carbonated soft
drink made by the Coca-Cola Company. If the vendor does not stock
Coke, it may ask whether you will accept a Pepsi or another
alternative, and you may accept, or decline, as you wish. But the
vendor will not—may not—simply dispense an alternative
carbonated beverage meant to mimic the Coke you requested, even if
signs on the walls say it dispenses only the alternative drink.1 For
that matter, if you walk into a pharmacy with a prescription for
1. E.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982)
(enjoining restaurants’ substitution of Pepsi-Cola in response to requests for
Coca-Cola, without oral disclosure of the substitution, and holding that signage
alone is insufficient); Coca-Cola Co. v. Dorris, 311 F. Supp. 287, 289–90 (E.D. Ark.
1970) (similar).
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Merck’s Zocor (which contains the active ingredient simvastatin) to
lower your cholesterol, the pharmacist may not dispense Upjohn’s
Lipitor (which contains atorvastatin calcium) instead of the product
you requested.2
And yet if you walk into the same pharmacy asking specifically
for Zocor, made by Merck, the pharmacist will likely hand you an
unbranded product containing simvastatin made by Hetero Labs,
Micro Labs, Oxford Pharmaceuticals, Accord Healthcare, Lupin,
Biocon Limited, Zydus Pharmaceuticals, YaoPharma, Aurobindo
Pharma, or Watson Labs.3 The pharmacist might not tell you that
you are receiving a different company’s product containing the same
active ingredient, though if you are attentive, you might notice the
substitution by reading the label of the prescription vial. The law not
only permits dispensing this “generic” product, but it also often
requires it. In the 1970s, payors—private insurance companies and
government programs—worked with the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”), the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and
consumer advocates to persuade state legislatures across the country
to authorize, and in some places require, this substitution.4
Although generic substitution is common, and indeed expected
when a consumer requests a medication, it conflicts with bedrock
principles of trademark law. The brand name Coke is registered with
the federal government as a trademark.5 The Coca-Cola Company
has invested in the quality of its beverage, its reputation, and its
trademark for decades. It uses the name Coke to distinguish its
beverages (including Diet Coke and Orange Vanilla Coke) from others
in the marketplace and to identify its products as Coke’s own
products.6 Consumers rely on familiarity with the company and their
own preference for the company’s products when they choose Coke.7
2. This would violate state pharmacy law, and if the pharmacist concealed
what was done, it would constitute “passing off”—a type of unfair competition.
See infra Subpart 0.B.
3. A list of the generic simvastatin products that might be substituted for
Zocor can be found by searching the FDA’s Orange Book database for simvastatin.
See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
scripts/cder/ob/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
4. See infra Part 0.
5. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks
/search (select “Search our trademark database (TESS), select desired criteria,
and enter “Coke” or “Coca Cola” in the searchbar) (last visited Oct. 22, 2021); see
also JUSTIA, https://trademarks.justia.com/714/68/coke-71468708.html (last
visited Oct. 22, 2021).
6. See Don N. Curdie, Infringement of the Trademark “Coca-Cola,” 27 BUS.
LAW. 297, 308 (1971) (stating that the trademark for Coca-Cola implies
identification).
7. See id. at 300 (“[T]he public in using the word ‘Coke’ meant to indicate
the drink that only The Coca-Cola Company originated.”).
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Dispensing a substitute cola when a consumer asks for Coke is
“passing off” and “unfair competition.”8 Treating the trademark—the
source indicator—as an invitation to dispense a product made by a
different company nullifies the trademark-owning company’s
investment in the quality of its product and compromises the
company’s reputation.9 Substitution allows the second company to
piggyback on the first company’s reputation and benefit from the
goodwill the first company has developed with its customers.10
Substitution of purported copies for drugs specifically requested
by consumers was unlawful until the 1970s.11 Today, though, it is the
lawful and usual practice. This results from a combination of the new
drug approval framework implemented by the FDA, the agency’s
practice of publicizing that certain generic drugs are “therapeutically
equivalent” to certain branded drugs,12 and state pharmacy laws that
permit or require substitution, as follows.13

8. Coca-Cola Co. v. Dorris, 311 F. Supp. 287, 289 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
9. See Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079,
1091 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he most corrosive and irreparable harm attributable to
trademark infringement is the inability of the victim to control the nature and
quality of the defendant’s goods.” (quoting Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner
Commc’ns, 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 1982))).
10. See Mary LaFrance, Passing Off and Unfair Competition: Conflict and
Convergence in Competition Law, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1413, 1425 (2011)
(discussing how some countries believe that companies should not be allowed to
advertise in any comparative forms and piggyback on another company’s already
well-established reputation).
11. See infra Part 0.
12. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., APPROVED DRUG
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (41st ed. 2021)
[hereinafter 41ST ORANGE BOOK].
13. New York ex rel. Scheiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 645 (2d Cir.
2015) (stating that every state either “permit[s] or require[s] pharmacists to
dispense a therapeutically equivalent, lower-cost generic drug in place of a brand
drug absent express direction from the prescribing physician that the
prescription must be dispensed as written”); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae
Federal Trade Commission Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, Mylan Pharms.
Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2236)
(“Since the late 1970s, state legislatures throughout the country have sought to
address the prescriber-payor pricing disconnect by enacting laws that enable (and
sometimes require) a pharmacist to substitute a therapeutically equivalent
generic drug (known as an ‘AB-rated’ drug) when presented with a prescription
for a brand-name drug, unless a physician directs or the patient requests
otherwise.”); Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New
Framework, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 175 (2016) (“States have also made it
easier for generics to reach the market through their enactment of drug product
selection (DPS) laws. Such laws, in effect in all fifty states today . . . allow (and
in some cases require) pharmacists—absent a doctor’s contrary instructions—to
fill prescriptions for brand-name drugs with generic versions.”).
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In the United States, a “new drug”—meaning a new drug
product, a medicine in the final form to be sold in the market and
administered to patients—cannot be placed on the market without
FDA approval.14 Premarket approval is required if the product is
new, even if the active ingredient has been marketed in the past.15
Products containing new, active ingredients, such as Zocor, require
an approved new drug application (“NDA”),16 while a generic copy
usually requires an approved abbreviated new drug application
(“ANDA”).17 This Article refers to drugs approved through the NDA
process as “brand drugs” and the companies that market them as
“brand companies.” Drugs approved through the ANDA process are
called “generic drugs” and the companies that market them are
“generic companies.”18
The differences between these applications are stark. An NDA
must show the brand product is safe and effective when used as
described in its labeling.19 Developing the safety and effectiveness
data needed for approval begins with laboratory and animal testing.20
Several phases of human (“clinical”) trials follow, beginning with
small safety tests in healthy subjects and moving through additional
phases of progressively larger trials with more ambitious goals.21 The
process usually ends with large randomized double-blind controlled
clinical trials.22 For a novel molecule, this process can take twelve

14. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). A “drug” is, among other things, any article—other
than a device—“intended for use in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
15. See United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 459 (1983)
(holding that a generic drug product is a “new drug” even if the active ingredient
has been marketed before).
16. If the active ingredient is biological, then the applicant instead submits
a biologics license application. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a). This Article does not discuss
biologics, which fall under a different federal framework.
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
18. Many companies market both types of products. This Article adopts the
conventions described in the text for simplicity’s sake.
19. AGATA DABROWSKA & SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41983, HOW
FDA APPROVES DRUGS AND REGULATES THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS 6 (2018).
20. Id. at 4.
21. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2021).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (requiring substantial evidence of effectiveness from
at least one adequate and well-controlled clinical trial); 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2021)
(describing characteristics of an “adequate and well-controlled trial”).
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years or more.23 It is an expensive endeavor with an uncertain
outcome.24
An ANDA is comparatively inexpensive and quick to produce
because the applicant need not prove safety and effectiveness.25
Instead, the applicant shows that its drug is the same as, and
bioequivalent to, a drug that was approved on the basis of safety and
effectiveness, known as its “reference” drug.26 A generic drug is the
same as its reference drug if they have the same active ingredient,
route of administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling.27 The
drug is “bioequivalent” to the reference drug if its active ingredient
reaches the site of action in the body to the same extent, and at the
same rate, as the active ingredient of the reference drug.28 With this
showing, the ANDA creates a scientific bridge to the reference drug
and relies on the safety and effectiveness data in the application that
supported the reference drug.29
The FDA lists approved new drug products in an annual
publication and searchable database known as the “Orange Book.”30
Since 1980, the agency has also included a “therapeutic equivalence”
assessment once it approves two products with the same active
23. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Trends in Risks Associated with New Drug
Development: Success Rates for Investigational Drugs, 87 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 272, 276 (2010) (finding that the development
of a new drug, from target identification through approval for marketing, takes
over twelve years and often much longer).
24. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry:
New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 26 (2016) (estimating an
average out-of-pocket cost per approved compound of about $1.4 billion and a
total preapproval cost of $2.56 billion); see also Erika Lietzan & Kristina M.L.
Acri née Lybecker, Distorted Drug Patents, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1317, 1328 n.54
(2020) (discussing studies that quantify likelihood of failure).
25. See Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 91, 106–08 (2016).
26. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
27. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iii), (v); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.94(a)(5)–(6) (2020).
It is possible to change the route of administration, dosage form, or strength and
still submit an ANDA with the FDA’s approval of a petition. 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(C). The result is called a “petitioned ANDA.” A second type of
abbreviated application may propose more significant differences from the
reference drug. Although the changes must be supported by new safety and
effectiveness data, the application otherwise relies on the brand company’s
research. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION 505(B)(2) 4 (1999),
https://www.fda.gov/media/72419/download. Neither abbreviated application is
relevant here. References to ANDAs in this Article are references to ordinary
(not-petitioned) ANDAs.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B).
29. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(i), (iv).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A)(i)(I); see generally 41ST ORANGE BOOK, supra note
12.
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ingredient.31 It considers two products therapeutically equivalent if
they are “pharmaceutical equivalents” (same active ingredient, route
of administration, dosage form, and strength) and bioequivalent.32
This means most generic drugs approved through ANDAs are deemed
therapeutically equivalent to their reference drugs. The FDA says
two products deemed therapeutically equivalent can be substituted
for each other “with the full expectation that the substituted product
can be expected to have the same clinical effect and safety profile as
the prescribed product.”33
Once the FDA approves generic drugs based on a particular
brand product, the generic drugs (as a group) tend to take over the
market.34 Many attribute this to the combination of the FDA
therapeutic equivalence rating and state generic substitution laws.35
Under these laws, if a doctor writes a prescription for a particular
brand drug, state law will either require or permit the pharmacist to
dispense a lower-cost generic equivalent instead. The doctor may be
able to instruct otherwise by specifying that the brand drug is
medically necessary (for instance, if the generic drugs contain an
inactive ingredient to which the patient is allergic) or by telling the
pharmacist to “dispense as written.”36 But if the doctor does not take
these steps and a generic is available, the pharmacist will usually
dispense the generic.37 Depending on the state’s law and the
pharmacy’s own policies, the pharmacist might not ask the consumer
for consent to substitute and might not tell the consumer substitution

31. 41ST ORANGE BOOK, supra note 12, at iv–v.
32. Id. at vii.
33. Id. at viii.
34. E.g., Murray L. Aitken et al., The Regulation of Prescription Drug
Competition and Market Responses: Patterns in Prices and Sales following Loss
of Exclusivity, in 76 MEASURING AND MODELING HEALTH CARE COSTS 243, 250
(Ana Aizcorbe et al. eds., 2018) (finding that six drugs that lost exclusivity
between 2009 and 2013 also lost sixty percent of their market share within (on
average) three months of generic entry); Ralf Boscheck, Intellectual Property
Rights and the Evergreening of Pharmaceuticals, 50 INTERECONOMICS, 221, 221,
224 (2015) (“As patents expire, the first generic competitor typically enters the
market with a 20 to 30 per cent discount relative to the branded product,
capturing about 44 to 80 per cent of total sales within the first full year after
launch.”).
35. See supra note 13.
36. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-280-125(2)(a)(I) (2019) (“If, in the opinion of
the practitioner, it is in the best interest of the patient that the pharmacist not
substitute an equivalent drug or interchangeable biological product for the
specific drug or biological product he or she prescribed, the practitioner may
convey this information to the pharmacist . . . [by] [i]nitialing by hand or
electronically a preprinted box that states ‘dispense as written’ or ‘DAW’ . . . .”).
37. Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical
Settlements: The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009,
1017 (2010).
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has happened.38 The consumer might receive the drug in an amber
vial with a label stating the manufacturer’s name, but the consumer
still might not realize substitution has occurred.39 At other times, the
consumer might receive the drug in original packaging from the
brand or generic company, such as a bottle or box with the
manufacturer clearly identified.
State legislatures amended their pharmacy laws to permit
generic drug substitution in the 1970s when the FDA began
approving generic copies of older drugs with expired patents.40
Substitution (of any medicine for the one prescribed) had been illegal
under state pharmacy laws as well as the law of unfair competition,
which applied to both the pharmacist and the manufacturer of the
substituted drug.41 Substitution had also been illegal since the
beginning of the century under FDA law, but the agency was
disinclined to interfere without a risk to consumers.42 Pharmacy law
and unfair competition law had been clear since the turn of the
century, and states even amended their pharmacy laws in the
1950s—during a surge in illegal substitution—to make what was
implicit more explicit.43 But by the early 1970s, public and private
payors were footing the bill for prescription drugs and looking for a
way to shift patients to low-cost alternatives to brand drugs. When
advances in regulatory science provided better assurance of the
quality of purported copies in the market, the modern substitution
arrangement emerged: abbreviated applications without clinical
data, publication of therapeutic equivalence advice from the FDA, and
permission under state law to engage in previously illegal practices.44
Substitution of less expensive generic drugs for their brand
counterparts saves payors money.45 It is also the main way generic
38. See Henry Grabowski et al., Does Generic Entry Always Increase
Consumer Welfare?, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373, 380 (2012).
39. At the time of writing, the Author was holding two vials of generic drugs;
one said in small print “MFR: TEVA USA,” but the other simply said “LANNETT”
in small print in the corner of the label without specifying the significance of the
word. The Author understood that Teva and Lannett make generic drugs, but
the ordinary consumer might not.
40. See infra Part 0.
41. Neil J. Facchinetti & W. Michael Dickson, Commentary, Access to
Generic Drugs in the 1950s: The Politics of a Social Problem, 72 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 468, 468, 470 (1982).
42. See id. at 470.
43. See Hossein Salehi & Stuart O. Schweitzer, Economic Aspects of Drug
Substitution, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spring 1985, at 59, 59.
44. See 41ST ORANGE BOOK, supra note 12, at iv; infra Subpart III.D.
45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRICING:
RESEARCH ON SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 4 (2012) (“[A] series of studies
estimated the total savings that have accrued to the U.S. health care system from
substituting generic drugs for their brand-name counterparts, and found that
from 1999 through 2010 doing so saved more than $1 trillion.”).

W03_LIETZAN

2021]

(DO NOT DELETE)

IGNORING DRUG TRADEMARKS

1/10/22 8:32 PM

953

companies get sales, because they choose not to promote their
products to prescribers or patients.46 A vast body of academic
literature attacks brand companies that continue to enjoy sales after
the FDA has approved generic drugs and deemed those drugs
therapeutically equivalent.47 This literature generally assumes the
importance of automatic substitution, and some scholars attack the
adoption and continued use of trademarks in connection with brand
products.
Professors Carrier, Dogan, and Lemley, for example, criticize
brand companies for introducing newer versions of their products and
(sometimes) withdrawing the outdated versions.48 The newer
products lack generic equivalents, and prescriptions for the newer
products will not automatically lead to dispensing generic drugs
based on the older brand products. Professor Carrier also criticizes
patent litigation settlements between brand companies and generic
companies that require the generic company to respect a portion of
the patent term, arguing that the brand company can introduce a
newer version of its product in the interim, which leads to the same
result.49 These criticisms are tied to the brand company’s use of a
trademark. Because generic companies choose not to promote their
products, a generic company depends on doctors to prescribe the
particular brand product to which its product is therapeutically
equivalent.50 If doctors have moved on to a different brand product,
the generic company’s business strategy will fail. Professor Feldman
complains that brand companies introduce newer versions of their
products shortly before patents covering older versions expire and
ensure a market shift to their newer products through many methods,
including advertising their products and encouraging doctors to
specify their brand names and decline substitution.51 Professor
46. Generic
Medicines,
ASS’N
FOR
ACCESSIBLE
MED.,
https://accessiblemeds.org/generic-medicines (last visited Oct. 22, 2021)
(“Generic manufacturers rarely spend money on advertising and
marketing . . . .”).
47. See, e.g., William F. Haddad, Generic Drugs–Tomorrow’s Market, 33
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 488, 490 (1978).
48. E.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory
Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 687–88, 717 (2009) (asserting that when “the
branded company makes repeated changes in a drug’s formulation to prevent
generic substitution, rather than to improve the efficacy of the drug product,” it
is able to “manipulate the FDA’s regulatory system” for “no purpose but to
exclude competition”); Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 13, at 171 (describing
“evergreening” as “(1) reformulating the product in a way that makes a generic
version of the original product not substitutable; and (2) encouraging doctors to
write prescriptions for the reformulated rather than the original product”).
49. Carrier, supra note 37, at 1009.
50. See Grabowski et al., supra note 38, at 377.
51. Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of
Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 499, 527 (2016).
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Kesselheim argues that generic companies should be allowed to use
the brand names of the products on which they are based and thus,
effectively, that brand companies should have to adopt a new brand
name for each product.52
This Article offers a deeper and more historically contextualized
examination of drug substitution, drug trademarks, and the
relationship between the two.53 It makes two claims.
First, the generic drug substitution bills of the 1970s created
exceptions to long-standing pharmacy laws that prohibited the
substitution of one product for another. This claim refutes statements
from supporters of generic drug substitution who suggest that
instead, the antisubstitution laws enacted in the 1950s were the
anomaly and that the laws of the 1970s simply repealed the
anomaly.54 Dispensing a drug other than the drug requested was
52. Ameet Sarpatwari & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The Case for Reforming Drug
Naming: Should Brand Trademark Protections Expire upon Generic Entry?,
PLOS MED. (Feb. 9, 2016), https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001955#sec005; see also Jonathan J. Darrow et al.,
Reconsidering the Scope of US State Laws Allowing Pharmacist Substitution of
Generic Drugs, BMJ (June 23, 2020), https://www.bmj.com/content/369/
bmj.m2236 (arguing lawmakers should consider authorizing pharmacists to
substitute alternatives that the FDA has not deemed therapeutically equivalent).
53. The academic literature on drug trademarks is thin. Some argue that
the FDA should play a more robust role in review of drug trademarks. Danielle
A. Gentin, You Say Zantac, I Say Xanax: A Critique of Drug Trademark Approval
and Proposals for Reform, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 255, 267 (2000) (proposing a
larger role for the FDA in review of drug trademarks because of “ever-increasing
confusion generated by today’s lexicon of drug names”). Others express concern
about the reliability of the testing of brand names performed for FDA purposes.
James A. Thomas, The Errors of Error Testing: Potential Liability Issues for
Medication Error Testing of Pharmaceutical Trademarks Under U.S. Law, 59
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 325, 328–29 (2004) (arguing medication error testing relating
to confusingly similar drug trademarks has “not been proven to provide reliably
predictable results,” which may create a liability risk for companies). Many
express concerns about the risks to patients of drug trademark confusion. See,
e.g., David A. Simon, Trademark Law and Consumer Safety, 72 FLA. L. REV. 673,
673, 675 (2020) (arguing that when confusion presents a safety risk, courts should
lower the bar for finding the mark deceptive); Sandra L. Rierson, Pharmaceutical
Counterfeiting and the Puzzle of Remedies, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 433,
434–35 (2008) (arguing that consumers who suffer from drug counterfeiting are
under-compensated for their injuries, while the trademark owners may be
overcompensated for activity labeled as counterfeiting under the Lanham Act);
Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An
Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945,
1027 (2018) (“For pharmaceutical products, trademark congestion can literally
kill. If different drugs with distinct effects have the same name, or names that
are too similar, doctors or pharmacists may inadvertently substitute one for the
other with potentially lethal consequences.”).
54. E.g., Facchinetti & Dickson, supra note 41, at 468 (“[I]n the 1950s . . . an
elite group of industrialists and professionals . . . were successful in defining
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illegal before the 1950s and, except for generic drug substitution,
remains illegal today.55 The state pharmacy laws of the 1950s
simplified enforcement, but they did not make something illegal that
had been legal before. Instead, they created an exception to the
general rule.
Second, the substitution laws were intended to, and did,
undermine proprietary rights. The true purpose and actual effect of
these laws was to undermine drug trademarks—in order to achieve
savings for payors—by instructing that the trademarks be ignored
when used in a doctor’s prescription if generic drugs are available in
the marketplace. In this context, then, the brand name associated
with the product (a source identifier) is treated as an identifier of its
active ingredient and becomes a thing identifier, rather than a source
identifier. This undermines the goodwill earned by the brand
company, and it conflicts with the goals of trademark law: enabling
efficiency in the market and protecting property rights in goodwill.
Part I explains the long-standing bar on substitution of one drug
for another prescribed. This prohibition derives from food and drug
law, pharmacy law, and unfair competition law. It was the law before
the 1970s and, except for generic drugs, remains the law today.56 Part
II describes the increase in illegal substitution during the middle of
the century and the steps taken by brand companies to respond.
Unfair competition suits against offending pharmacists generally
succeeded, as did suits against the manufacturers of the illicit

brand substitution as a health hazard and in solving the problem to their own
satisfaction, with the cooperation of state officials and state
legislators. . . . [There was] partial repeal of the anti-substitution laws in the
1970s . . . .”); DOMINIQUE A. TOBBELL, PILLS, POWER, AND POLICY: THE STRUGGLE
FOR DRUG REFORM IN COLD WAR AMERICA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 164 (2012)
(asserting that by the end of the 1970s reformers had “succeeded in overturning
the state substitution laws of the 1950s”); Thomas J. Bollyky & Aaron S.
Kesselheim, Reputation and Authority: The FDA and the Fight over U.S.
Prescription Drug Importation, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1331, 1377 (2020) (“Starting in
the late 1970s, U.S. states began repealing the anti-substitution dispensing laws
that had prevented pharmacists from substituting other versions of a drug for
the specific brand-name version indicated on a prescription.”). Supporters of the
substitution laws in the 1970s said the same thing. E.g., Haddad, supra note 47,
at 489 (complaining that the brand companies were proposing changes to state
generic drug substitution laws to allow consumers to specify a brand name,
overriding substitution, and referring to the “successful route of the fifties when
they used state legislatures to prevent substitution”); The Pharmacist’s Role in
Product Selection, 11 J. AM. PHARM. ASS’N 181, 182 (1971) (“The drug industry
fought the counterfeiting problem in part by mounting its successful campaign to
bring the antisubstitution laws into being.”).
55. There is a parallel exception for interchangeable biologics, but as noted,
this Article does not consider biologics. See supra note 16.
56. See discussion infra Part I.
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copies.57 State pharmacy boards also acted. Because a strategy of
repeated unfair competition suits was expensive and inefficient, the
brand companies turned to shoring up state pharmacy law with
language confirming what the state pharmacy boards had been
saying: substitution was improper. The antisubstitution laws of the
1950s reflected the merger in policymaking of two doctrinal bases for
opposition to substitution: concerns about economic adulteration
(economic fraud on the pharmacy’s part and possible risk to patients
tied to inferior products) and complaints about competitive harm (to
the companies whose products were specified by the consumer).58
Part III explains how the exception for generic drugs came about.
Concerns about the prices of new drugs—especially after drug
research and development increased in complexity, risk, and expense
over the 1960s—fueled hostility to drug trademarks and concerns
about the brand loyalty of doctors.59 With the spread of prescription
drug coverage in insurance, the payor community developed a
financial stake in selection of medicines and sought to shift patients
to less expensive alternatives.60 The exceptions enacted in the
1970s—permitting substitution with therapeutically equivalent
generic drugs—responded to economic pressure from increasing drug
prices after the 1962 amendments to the drug regulatory framework.
These exceptions could be justified by advances in regulatory science
that had reduced concerns about substitute products being inferior.61
Part IV reconsiders the generic drug exception in view of the
purposes of trademark law and the effect of substitution on drug
trademarks. It begins with a fundamental point that is regularly
overlooked in scholarship and policymaking discussions: a generic
product is not the same as the corresponding brand product. Certain
aspects, such as the active ingredient, are the same. But sameness,
here, is a regulatory concept; the word “same” does not assume its
ordinary English language meaning.62 And the products in the
market are not the same. They are made and sold by different
companies with different histories and reputations. They may be

57. See discussion infra Subpart II.B; see, e.g., Winthrop Chem. Co. v.
Weinberg, 60 F.2d 461, 463 (3d Cir. 1932) (suit against pharmacist); William R.
Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 527–29, 533 (1924) (suit against
manufacturer).
58. MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS 142–43
(1974).
59. Joseph P. Reid, Note, A Generic Price Scandal: Too Bitter a Pill for the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act to Swallow?, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 309, 313–14 (1999) (discussing how prices of new drugs fueled
hostility to drug trademarks); see also infra note 250 and accompanying text
(discussing the brand loyalty of doctors).
60. See discussion infra Subpart III.C.
61. See discussion infra Subparts III.B, III.D.
62. See infra pp. 153–55 and notes 338–50.
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made using different processes and different raw ingredients.63 This
provides good reason to protect trademarks in this setting.
Trademarks distinguish products in the market by their source.64
Some argue that a brand company’s trademark improperly
perpetuates its patent-based exclusivity in the market. The theory is
that the patent allowed the company to build brand loyalty, which is
then used after patent expiry to perpetuate monopoly by luring
consumers (really, doctors) away from lower-priced substitutes.65 But
we do not undermine trademarks in other product sectors on this
basis, even when these products have patented features.66 As Part IV
explains, we do not because patents and trademarks pertain to
different things, play different roles, and serve different purposes.
Finally, creating an exception in pharmacy law and ignoring the
trademark in this setting may not be necessary anymore, if it ever
was. Substitution was justified in part on a supposed market failure
tied to separation between the person choosing the medicine (the
doctor) and the person paying for the medicine (the patient). More
recent explanations add the modern third-party payor, who (they say)
neither chooses nor consumes. Permission to substitute was meant
to allow pharmacists to act in their own interest, substituting a drug
they had paid less for while recovering more in reimbursement. The
market has changed fundamentally since the 1960s when
policymakers articulated this market failure to justify generic drug
substitution, and it is far from clear what would happen today
without generic substitution laws in place. Payors play a powerful
role now in steering doctors and patients to lower-cost alternatives.67
They can choose to reimburse only for generic drugs, and they can
require doctors to prescribe generically.68 Doctors can, however,
choose to write generic prescriptions of their own accord.
A brief conclusion follows.
The antisubstitution norm of
pharmacy law and the protection of drug trademarks make sense once
it is clear that the brand drugs and their generic equivalents are not
the same product. Although payors have a strong interest in paying
less for drugs (and taxpayers have an interest in government payors
doing so), payors can revise their policies to cover the least expensive
products that are medically appropriate. This can be accomplished
without undermining property rights and contributing to widespread
conflating of brand products with their underlying active ingredients.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See infra pp. 157–58 and notes 357–61.
See infra note 377 and accompanying text.
See infra note 383 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Subpart IV.C.
See infra pp. 172–73 and notes 429–33.
See infra pp. 172–73 and notes 429–33.
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I. THE PROHIBITION OF SUBSTITUTION
Substitution—selling a product, including a medicine, that is not
the one requested—has been disfavored under the law for centuries.
Trying to encourage that practice by, for instance, making copies of a
commonly requested product and encouraging their substitution has
also been condemned. This disfavored status has manifested in “food
and drug” law—the regulatory schemes applicable to food and drug
products—state law governing the pharmacy profession, and state
and federal law relating to unfair competition and trademarks.
A.

Food and Drug Law

Long before the period that concerns us, governments tried to
protect the public from “substitution” in food products.69 The history
of drug substitution begins with food because the line between food
and drugs was blurry through the nineteenth century.70 In food law,
this act of substitution is known as “economic adulteration.”71
Depending on the nature of the substitution, economic adulteration
of food may have health consequences, but initially substitution was
viewed foremost as a fraud on the consumer.72 Governments from
ancient times to the present have addressed substitution and other
types of economic adulteration in food.
Peter Barton Hutt’s
exhaustive history of food adulteration and misbranding laws
provides examples ranging from Roman civil laws on substitution of
food ingredients73 to medieval British proclamations prohibiting the
mixing of wines and then sale under the name that commanded the
higher price74 to state laws in the 1800s and early 1900s prohibiting
69. See generally Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of
Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 2 (1984) (providing an overview of government regulation of
adulterated or misbranded food from an economic perspective).
70. Kara W. Swanson, Food and Drug Law as Intellectual Property Law:
Historical Reflections, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 331, 341 (“Throughout much of the
nineteenth century, the boundary between food and drugs was porous.”). It
remains blurry now. See generally Lewis Grossman, Foods, Drugs, and Droods:
A Historical Consideration of Definitions and Categories in American Food and
Drug Law, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1091 (2008) (discussing that courts grant the FDA
wide discretion to interpret the definitions of various terms in the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act).
71. Hutt & Hutt, supra note 69, at 63–64.
72. See id. at 63 (“In broad scope, [the economic adulteration provisions of
the Food, Drug, and Cometic Act] prohibited economic fraud on the consumer by
a manufacturer . . . .”).
73. Id. at 5 (noting liability under Roman civil law for stellionatus, that is,
“where anyone has substituted some article for another” (quoting 11 S.P. SCOTT,
THE CIVIL LAW 8 (1932))).
74. Id. at 16 (describing 1419 proclamation “prohibiting the adulteration of
wine or the mixing of one wine with another for sale under a name that
commanded a higher price”).
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substitution with inferior ingredients as well as sale of “imitation”
products under the name of the product imitated.75
So too with drugs. The concept of drug adulteration traces its
lineage to the seminal work of Frederick Accum, a German chemist
and author of the definitive 1820 treatise, A Treatise on Adulteration
of Food and Culinary Poisons.76 Although Accum focused on food, he
devoted eleven pages to adulteration of medicines, including the
“fraud” by which less expensive ingredients were substituted into
compounds.77
The substitution fraud described by Accum involved drugs
derived from “materia medica”—botanical and mineral compounds
derived from “nature’s pharmacy.”78 Rather than genuine Peruvian
bark powder, Accum wrote, the public often received “a spurious
compound of mahogany sawdust and oak wood, ground into powder,
mixed with a proportion of good quinquina.”79 The price of genuine
bark, he added, was “not lower than twelve shillings the pound,” but
the “powder bark” substitute was supplied to apothecaries at “three
or four shillings a pound.”80 Similar fraud was used in the
manufacture of rhubarb powder, ipecacuanha powder, and “other
simple and compound medicines of great potency.”81 Accum explained
that “unprincipled dealers in drugs and medicines” were concerned
mainly with cheapness rather than “genuineness and excellence.”82
This substitution for economic gain was “fraud” and the drugs
“counterfeited.”83
Twenty years after Accum published his treatise, in the United
States, Lewis C. Beck gave hundreds of examples of common
adulteration of medicines in his treatise on the topic.84 Some sellers

75. Id. at 41 (noting Virginia statute from 1900 deeming a food adulterated
if “any inferior substance or substances has or have been substituted wholly or
in part for the article so that the product when sold shall deceive or tend to
deceive the purchaser” and also if “it be an imitation of and sold under the specific
name of another article”).
76. See generally FREDERICK ACCUM, A TREATISE ON ADULTERATIONS OF FOOD
AND CULINARY POISONS (2d ed. 1820) (providing methods to detect the fraudulent
adulterations of food); see also Jillian London, Tragedy, Transformation, and
Triumph: Comparing the Factors and Forces that Led to the Adoption of the 1860
Adulteration Act in England and the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act in the United
States, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 315, 316–18 (2014) (discussing role of Accum’s
treatise).
77. See ACCUM, supra note 76, at 15–26.
78. Swanson, supra note 70, at 346–47.
79. ACCUM, supra note 76, at 16.
80. Id. at 17.
81. Id. at 17–18.
82. Id. at 18.
83. Id. at 19 (discussing the “adulteration of spirit of hartshorn”).
84. See generally LEWIS C. BECK, ADULTERATION OF VARIOUS SUBSTANCES
USED IN MEDICINE AND THE ARTS, WITH THE MEANS OF DETECTING THEM: INTENDED
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of “cochineal,” or the dried body of the female Coccus Cacti L., instead
provided a mix of dust and insect waste, which had been turned into
a paste with water and then granulated to pieces resembling the dried
insect in question.85 Plaster of Paris was sometimes sold as “ergot.”86
Beck also noted examples of dilution: for example, iodine bottles were
diluted with slate, coal, and graphite.87
To say that something has been “substituted” for the medicine
requested (or for a component of the medicine) requires a shared
understanding of what the medicine requested is. Pharmacopeias
filled this role. In the United States, physicians launched the United
States Pharmacopeia (“U.S. Pharmacopeia”) in 1820, describing the
composition of common medicines and providing directions for their
formulation.88 By the middle of the nineteenth century, the U.S.
Pharmacopeia had direct competition in the United States from
Beck’s treatise.89 A companion publication from the American
Pharmaceutical Association (“APhA”), the National Formulary,
emerged in 1888.90
Eventually, Congress made the U.S.
Pharmacopeia and the National Formulary the “official” compendia
for purposes of federal law.91
Firms that made medicines listed in the U.S. Pharmacopeia and
crafted these medicines in accordance with the publication using the
ingredients specified were known as “ethical” manufacturers.92 Over
time these firms sold other medicines as well. More sophisticated—
though still naturally derived—medicines emerged over the second
half of the nineteenth century, including early vaccines,
chemotherapies, and antibiotics.93 By the end of the nineteenth
century the Germans were synthesizing medicines in the
laboratory.94 Ethical manufacturers sold these drugs, disclosing the
ingredients in the labels and to the physicians to whom they sold the
MANUAL FOR THE PHYSICIAN, THE APOTHECARY, AND THE ARTISAN (1846)
(exhibiting the adulterations of different substances used in medicines and the
ways to detect these adulterations).
85. See id. at 71.
86. Id. at 87.
87. Id. at 99–100.
88. A decade later, control of this publication shifted to pharmacists, where
it would remain for the rest of the century. Swanson, supra note 70, at 346.
89. Id. at 346–47.
90. Jeremy A. Greene, What’s in a Name? Generics and the Persistence of the
Pharmaceutical Brand in American Medicine, 66 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCIS.
468, 478 (2011).
91. Pure Food & Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 6, 34 Stat. 768, 769 (1906)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)) (defining “drug” to include “all medicines and
preparations recognized in the United States Pharmacopeia or National
Formulary”).
92. See Greene, supra note 90, at 475–76.
93. Swanson, supra note 70, at 342–43.
94. Id. at 347.
AS A
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drugs.95 Every active ingredient has a chemical name, based on its
composition and structure.96 Few people other than chemists are able
to remember these names, however, and another name emerged for
use in the labels—a name meant to be nonproprietary, a scientific
name for the substance, which everyone could use.97
In the final quarter of the nineteenth century, lawmakers in the
United States and Europe began to tackle adulteration of drugs.98
They focused not only on the medicines sold by ethical manufacturers
but also on “patent” medicines.99 Patent medicines were not the
subject of patents, and they were distinguished from ethical drugs by
the secrecy of their ingredients.100 The companies selling patent
medicines affixed invented names to their products (omitting the
ingredients) and marketed to consumers, often with overblown claims
about panacea-like properties.101
These companies regularly
swapped out ingredients for their own convenience.102
In the United States, federal lawmakers introduced more than
one hundred bills addressing adulteration of foods, drugs, or both, in
the decades before the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.103 A few

95. See id. at 353–54.
96. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROZAC LABEL 19 (2009),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2009/018936s075s077lbl.
pdf (stating that the active ingredient of a more modern drug product made by
Eli Lilly, PROZAC, “is designated (±)-N-methyl-3-phenyl-3-[(α,α,α-trifluoro-ptolyl)oxy]propylamine hydrochloride and has the empirical formula of
C17H18F3NO•HCl”).
97. Mahsa Salsabili et al., Naming of Chiral Drugs: Should We Revisit?, 75
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 65, 66, 69–70 (2020) (discussing the use of nonproprietary
names to benefit the prescriber, pharmacist, and others).
98. See, e.g., Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875, 45 Vict. c. 63 § 6 (Eng.) (stating
no one could “sell to the prejudice of the purchaser any article of . . . drug which
is not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded by such
purchaser”).
99. See Swanson, supra note 70, at 352–53.
100. The line between companies selling USP medicines and those selling
patent medicines was not rigid. See id. at 376.
101. Although the traditional view holds patent medicine was little more than
quackery, recent archival work suggests that the makers were not duplicitous.
See generally JOSEPH M. GABRIEL, MEDICAL MONOPOLY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (2014).
102. Swanson, supra note 70, at 354 (“Doctors and pharmacists further
alleged manufacturers had no compunction about changing the ingredients of a
medicine to respond to fluctuations in prices of ingredients, while continuing to
sell it under the same packaging, using the secrecy of their formulas to disguise
shifting compositions. Businessmen bought and sold trade names rather than
secret formulas, patents, or manufacturing know-how as they sought to maximize
profits.”).
103. See Charles Wesley Dunn, Its Legislative History: Original Federal Food
and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, as Amended, 1 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.Q. 297, 297–
98 (1946).
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became law.104 Most of the enacted laws concerned food,105 but federal
legislation enacted in 1848 required examination of all medicines
proposed for import into the United States and rejection of any found
“so far adulterated, or in any manner deteriorated, as to render them
inferior in strength and purity to the standard established” by
pharmacopeias in the United States and Europe.106 By 1888, every
state and territory—except Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina,
and the Washington Territory—had a pure food law, a pure drug law,
or both, and many addressed economic adulteration of drugs.107 In
1881, for instance, New Jersey enacted legislation deeming a drug
adulterated if (1) it was sold under a name found in the U.S.
Pharmacopeia but differed from the standard in that publication, or
(2) it was sold under a name found in some other pharmacopeia or
standard work on materia medica and differed materially from the
standard in that work.108 New York passed a law containing similar
language the same year.109
The language of New York’s law found its way into the federal
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.110 Under that law, a drug was
considered adulterated if it was sold under a name specified in the
U.S. Pharmacopeia and differed from the description in that book in
strength, quality, or purity (unless the label clearly stated this
differential characteristic).111 It was also adulterated if its strength
or purity fell below the professed standard or quality under which it
was sold. Further—and this did not appear in the New York or New
Jersey laws—a drug was “misbranded” under federal law if it was “an
imitation of or offered for sale under the name of another article.”112
It was also misbranded if the package or label bore a false or
misleading statement about its ingredients.113
104. Thomas A. Bailey, Congressional Opposition to Pure Food Legislation,
1879–1906, 36 AM. J. SOCIO. 52, 52 (1930) (noting that from January 20, 1879, to
June 30, 1906, “190 measures to protected in some way the consumer of food and
drugs appeared in Congress” and “eight became law”).
105. See, e.g., Prohibition of the Importation of Adulterated and Spurious
Teas Act, ch. 64, 22 Stat. 451, 451–52 (1883); Act of Aug. 2, 1886, ch. 840, 24 Stat.
209, 209–10 (1886) (defining butter and also imposing a tax upon and regulating
the manufacture, sale, importation, and exportation of oleomargarine).
106. Act of June 26, 1848, ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237, 238 (1848) (preventing the
importation of adulterated and spurious drugs and medicines).
107. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE YEAR 1888 408–10 (1888)
(listing state laws).
108. Act of Mar. 25, 1881, ch. 217, 1881 N.J. Laws 283, 283.
109. Act of May 28, 1881, ch. 407, 1881 N.Y. Laws 553, 553.
110. Pure Food & Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 7, 34 Stat. 768, 769–70
(1906)
111. Id.
112. Id. § 8, 34 Stat. at 770.
113. Id.
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The modern federal drug regulatory framework, dating to 1938,
contains the same basic prohibitions. The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) deems a drug “adulterated” if it purports to
be a drug the name of which is recognized in an official compendium,
and its strength differs from, or its quality or purity falls below, the
standard in that compendium.114 A drug is “misbranded” if “its
labeling is false or misleading in any particular.”115 It is also
misbranded if it is “an imitation of another drug” or if it is “offered for
sale under the name of another drug.”116
The drug industry evolved, however, and has continued to do so.
Earlier, chemical companies (such as Merck) made bulk chemicals for
pharmacists and drug companies (such as Smith, Kline & French
Laboratories), which in turn specialized in making finished products
and marketing.117 By the 1930s, ethical firms were inventing
medicines in their laboratories and seeking patents—a previously
disfavored practice.118 By the middle part of the twentieth century,
the chemical companies and pharmaceutical companies evolved into
vertically integrated companies that handled research, production,
and marketing.119
To the modern reader, economic adulteration and misbranding
under historical food and drug laws may seem beside the point.
Modern readers understand the word “substitution” as a reference to
generic drug substitution—dispensing a high-quality FDA-approved
product that contains the same active ingredient as, and has been
deemed equivalent to, the product specified.120 These earlier laws,
the modern reader may feel, pertained to something different:
dispensing something inferior, perhaps dispensing something

114. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, §
501(b), 52 Stat. 1040, 1049 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 351(b)). The 1938
statute also deemed a drug misbranded if it was not designated by a name
recognized in an official compendium unless its label bore its “common or usual
name,” if there was one. § 502(e), 52 Stat. at 1050–51. This provision would
change in 1962. See infra Subpart 0. If the drug was made from more than one
active ingredient, the label needed the common or usual name of each. § 502(e),
52 Stat. at 1050–51. A drug is similarly adulterated even if it does not bear a
name recognized in a compendium, but its strength differs from, or its purity or
quality falls below, that which it purports or is represented to possess. § 501(d),
52 Stat. at 1050; 21 U.S.C. § 351(c).
115. § 502(a), 52 Stat. at 1050; 21 U.S.C. § 352(a).
116. § 502(i), 52 Stat. at 1051; 21 U.S.C. § 352(i).
117. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION: STAFF REPORT
TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 15–16, 143 (1979) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
118. See Swanson, supra note 70, at 376.
119. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SHAPING THE INDUSTRIAL
CENTURY: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN CHEMICAL
AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES (2005) (describing evolution in the drug
industry over the twentieth century).
120. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
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containing
unrelated
ingredients,
perhaps
material
misrepresentations about the nature of the product sold. But that is
the point. The concept and act of “substitution” evolved as the
companies and marketplace evolved, as the regulatory framework
evolved, and as regulatory science improved.
Questions of identity and quality have been inherent in
substitution since the beginning. At first, food and drugs were
sometimes indistinct, medicines were made by pharmacists as well as
proprietary firms, prescriptions were only sometimes used, and the
federal government played no role. Without sophisticated scientific
tools for comparison of active ingredients, and without understanding
how to compare biological action in the body, even the companies (or
pharmacists, as the case may be) that meant to make high-quality
copies could not verify that they had done so.121 Others meant to
make outright shams, which they sold to pharmacists, to patients, or
to both.122 The food and drug concerns about economic adulteration
and misbranding provide context for the history that follows in the
next subparts. The antisubstitution pharmacy laws enacted in the
1950s reflected similar concerns about economic fraud and consumer
safety, in addition to concerns about unfair competition and
trademark infringement.123 But then, as Part 0 explains, changes in
the regulatory framework and improvements in the science stripped
away these arguments against substitution—leaving unfair
competition and trademark considerations in its wake.124 These
would be brushed aside with complaints about the cost of medicine.
B.

Pharmacy Law

In the early decades of the twentieth century, state pharmacy
laws addressed substitution by pharmacists. For example, under
Illinois law at the turn of the century, a pharmacist who received a
prescription for “any drug, medicine, chemical or pharmaceutical
preparation” could not “substitute or cause to be substituted therefor,
without notification to the purchaser, any other drug, medicine,
chemical or pharmaceutical preparation.”125 New York’s penal code
deemed it a misdemeanor for any person filling a prescription or order
121. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
PROCESS VALIDATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (2011),
https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/Process-Validation--GeneralPrinciples-and-Practices.pdf (describing the general processes required of
companies to verify quality of pharmaceuticals).
122. Amy M. Bunker, Deadly Dose: Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual
Property and Human Health, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 493, 494–95
(2007).
123. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
124. See infra Part III.
125. Act of May 11, 1901, ch. 91, 1901 Ill. Law 1409, 1413 (regulating the
practice of pharmacy in the state of Illinois).
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for medicine to substitute or dispense “a different article for or in lieu
of any article prescribed, ordered, or demanded.”126
For several years in the 1930s, the National Industrial Recovery
Act (“NIRA”) provided another source of authority prohibiting
substitution by pharmacists.127 Section 3 of NIRA authorized the
President to approve a code of fair competition proposed by and for
any trade or industrial association or group.128 The National
Recovery Administration (“NRA”) administered the statute, but each
code of fair competition established a “code authority,” comprising
individuals selected by the trade and nonvoting government
representatives. This authority helped enforce the code.129
In August 1933, the NRA published a proposed code for the retail
drug industry (pharmacies), which would have banned
substitution.130 Under the NRA, certain practices would be deemed
“an act of unfair competition within the meaning of the Federal Trade
Commission Act,” including (1) “[s]ubstituting another article for the
kind ordered without due notice to the purchaser” and (2)
“[p]ackaging or selling any product or item that is an imitation or
unfairly similar to another product in design, style, mark, or
brand.”131 Although a stand-alone code for pharmacies was never

126. N.Y EDUC. LAW § 6816(1)(a) (McKinney 2021) (“Any person who,
in . . . filling any order for drugs [or] medicines . . . substitutes or dispenses a
different article for or in lieu of any article prescribed, ordered, or
demanded . . . or puts up a greater or less quantity of any ingredient specified in
any such prescription, order, or demand than that prescribed, ordered, or
demanded . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”); People v. Silberman, 252 A.D.
770, 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937) (affirming conviction of defendant for “substituting
and dispensing a different article for that ordered in the prescription which he
filled”); see also Leonard Wolfram, Criminal Liability Without Fault—The
Druggist’s Dilemma in New York, 3 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.Q. 284, 288–89 (1948)
(discussing New York law).
127. See generally National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48
Stat. 195 (1933).
128. The President could do so after finding (1) the group imposed “no
inequitable restrictions on admission to membership” and was “truly
representative” of the trade or industry, and (2) the code was “not designed to
promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises,” would not
“operate to discriminate against them,” and would tend to effectuate the policy of
the statute. Id. § 3(a), 48 Stat. at 196.
129. See Records of the National Recovery Administration [NRA], NAT’L
ARCHIVES #9.9, https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/
009.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2021); see DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE
RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 92–95 (1988).
130. See generally NAT’L RECOVERY ADMIN., CODE OF FAIR COMPETITION FOR
THE RETAIL DRUG INDUSTRY (Aug. 26, 1933), https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/GOVPUB-Y3_N21_8-b52b7f431736344baf485088ef66c581/pdf/
GOVPUB-Y3_N21_8-b52b7f431736344baf485088ef66c581.pdf.
131. Id. art. VII, §§ 4–5, at 4.
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finalized,132 President Roosevelt approved a broader Code of Fair
Competition for the Retail Trade in October 1933.133 Supplemental
provisions at the end, sometimes known as the “Retail Drug Code,”
stated that “[n]o drug retailer shall substitute another article or any
part thereof for the kind ordered, without due notice to and consent
of the customer.”134 Support for the Retail Drug Code within the
pharmacy profession surely stemmed from a desire to prevent the
aggressive price competition that substitution with cheaper, and
often inferior, ingredients enabled. It may have also stemmed from
desire to elevate the status of the profession, as suggested by the
advertisements of pharmacies touting the fact they did not engage in
substitution.135
In its opposition to substitution and in support for the Retail
Drug Code, the pharmacy profession found an ally in ethical drug
manufacturers.
In the 1930s, the companies turned to the
Prescription Protective Bureau (“PPB”) to audit pharmacy practices
around the country.136 The PPB explained in advertising that “there
exist manufacturing concerns whose business is almost entirely
composed of substitute items, whose high pressure salesmen are
continually bombarding the retailer to dispense cheap and unreliable
products in place of the items prescribed.”137 But “[w]ith the advent
of the retail drug code . . . machinery has been set up for the
extermination of the substitutor.”138
PPB staff presented
prescriptions to pharmacies for filling, and when PPB staff detected
substitution, they complained to the local NRA compliance authority
(citing the NRA Code) or state pharmacy board (citing the state’s
pharmacy laws or the NRA Code).139 PPB was active throughout the

132. See Full List of NRA Fair Competition Codes, LIBR. OF CONG.,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/source/nra-fair-competition-codes-full-list.xls
(last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
133. See generally Exec. Order No. 6351, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/
pt?id=mdp.39015081302559&view=1up&seq=35&skin=2021 (approving the
Code of Fair Competition for the Retail Trade by President Roosevelt).
134. See id. at 44.
135. See, e.g., Feek Pharmacy, Substitutes, ADIRONDACK REC., Aug. 19, 1937,
at 4.
136. Although the PPB is shrouded in mystery, it was based in New York and
helped brand companies fight substitution. Fighting Substitution by Code, 166
PRINTERS’ INK 62, 62 (1934) (“[PBB] is undertaking to prosecute, in the interest
of several drug manufacturers, dealers who substitute on their products.”); see
also NRA Control of Substitution, 34 DRUG & COSM. INDUS. 65, 65 (1934) (“Samuel
F. Friend, who has served many large drug manufacturers in the solution of their
problems, is director of the Prescription Protective Bureau, which has offices in
New York.”).
137. An Appeal to the Ethical Druggist, 56 N.A.R.D. J. 953, 953 (1934).
138. Fighting Substitution by Code, supra note 136, at 62.
139. PPB also asked prescribers to report pharmacies suspected of
substitution. E.g., Across the Desk: Best Doctors at Mercy of Crooked Chemists,
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country in the 1930s—filing complaints, getting pharmacists hauled
before pharmacy boards, and securing convictions and fines. In 1934,
for example, the New York Times reported the Helena Cut-Rate Drug
Store had been convicted and fined $500 under the NRA Code for
substituting a “crude imitation” for Smith’s Ergoapiol.140 The PPB
filed nearly five dozen complaints with New York’s Retail Drug Code
Authority in that year alone.141
In May 1935, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its lawmaking power
when enacting section 3 of the NIRA, ending the brief experiment
with federal enforcement of the pharmacy profession’s code.142 State
pharmacy laws precluding substitution remained in place, however,
and actions before pharmacy boards continued. For instance, several
dozen pharmacists were hauled before the Massachusetts pharmacy
board in 1936 based on complaints filed by PPB.143 In some places,
enforcement under the NRA Code transitioned to enforcement under
state pharmacy law. PPB audited Goin’s Drug Store in Kansas City
twice in 1935, for example, finding the store had dispensed a
substitute for the Eli Lilly product prescribed.144 The organization
wrote to the Retail Drug Code Authority about a substitution
occurring in March, relying on the NRA Code, and to the Board of
Pharmacy about a substitution occurring in August, accusing the
pharmacists of violating the “drug and pharmacy law” of Missouri.145
The state pharmacy board has archived the complaints together, as

37 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 1966, 1966–67 (1937) (“The Prescription Protective
Bureau . . . has been waging a war on substituting druggists for several years,
and [the Bureau] invites physicians to report any that need attention.”).
140. Druggist Is Fined $500: Guilty of Violating NRA Code by Filling
Prescription Falsely, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1934, at 8.
141. Fighting Substitution by Code, supra note 136, at 62.
142. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42
(1935) (finding that statutorily authorizing the President to issue as law codes
written by industry, with no constraints or guidance in place, violated the
nondelegation doctrine).
143. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. DEP’T OF CIV. SERV. & REGISTRATION, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN PHARMACY (1936) (indicating a warning
was given in each case, because “the method of securing the evidence in these
cases was not complete enough to warrant a suspension of permit or certificate”).
144. Complaint from Prescription Protective Bureau to Retail Drug Code
Auth. for Kansas City, Missouri (1935) (on file with author) (indicating “1st
violation” on “Mar. 12, 1935”); Complaint from Prescription Protective Bureau to
Bd. of Pharmacy for Missouri (1935) (on file with author) (indicating “2nd
violation” on “August 5th, 1935”).
145. See Complaint from Prescription Protective Bureau to Retail Drug Code
Auth. for Kansas City, Missouri (1935) (on file with author) (indicating “1st
violation” on “Mar. 12, 1935”); Complaint from Prescription Protective Bureau to
Bd. of Pharmacy for Missouri (1935) (on file with author) (indicating “2nd
violation” on “August 5th, 1935”).
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“1st violation” and “2nd violation.”146 Through the 1930s and 1940s,
pharmacists continued to illegally substitute,147 and pharmacy
boards continued to act.148
C.

Unfair Competition Law

In prohibiting substitution and imitation, food and drug laws aim
to protect consumers from both fraud and risk. The pharmacy laws
address these same concerns, though the NRA Code for pharmacies
also reflects concerns that honest pharmacists faced unfair price
competition from those who substituted inferior products, imitation
products, or even worthless products.149 These sales also raised
competitive issues for the manufacturers of the products requested,
which explains their investment in enforcement under the NRA Code
and state pharmacy laws.150 These firms were harmed by both the
substituting pharmacists and the maker of the substituted drug.151
The harm was a type of unfair competition and, sometimes,
trademark infringement.

146. See Complaint from Prescription Protective Bureau to Retail Drug Code
Auth. for Kansas City, Missouri (1935) (on file with author) (indicating “1st
violation” on “Mar. 12, 1935”); Complaint from Prescription Protective Bureau to
Bd. of Pharmacy for Missouri (1935) (on file with author) (indicating “2nd
violation” on “August 5th, 1935”).
147. Across the Desk: Best Doctors at Mercy of Crooked Chemists, supra note
139, at 1966 (reporting that fifteen percent of all pharmacists substituted when
filling prescriptions, based on “actual analysis of test prescriptions checked in a
recent survey of drug stores through the United States”).
148. E.g., Letter from Irving Zapp, Assistant Dir. of Prescription Protective
Bureau, to Newt Gardner, Sec’y of the Missouri Bd. of Pharmacy (May 25, 1937)
(on file with author) (enclosing “eleven formal complaints against Kansas City
druggists who substituted during our recent survey”); Letter from Newt Gardner,
Sec’y of the Missouri Bd. of Pharmacy, to Irving Zapp, Assistant Dir. of
Prescription Protective Bureau (May 28, 1937) (on file with author) (replying
three days later enclosing “a list of druggists . . . who substituted on prescriptions
and who were notified to personally appear” before the board two weeks later);
see also JEREMY A. GREENE, GENERIC: THE UNBRANDING OF MODERN MEDICINE
137–38 (2014) (describing a Michigan pharmacist who lost his license in 1949
after substituting Upjohn’s prednisolone for the Schering prednisolone product—
Meticorten—prescribed by the physician, even though the physician had orally
consented to the substitution, and also noting court reversed the decision).
149. See John L. Hammer, Jr., Substitution on Prescription, 6 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 775, 775 (1951) (referring to “the druggist who actually [engages in
substitution as] the perpetrator of [an] unethical practice” that amounts to “an
easy way to make money” for the manufacturers of substitutes).
150. See id. at 777 (discussing the extent to which substitutes “cut into the
market for genuine product” and drive down profitability in light of the fact that
the genuine “manufacturer’s research, promotional, and administrative expenses
are the same without [substitution] as with it”).
151. See id. (describing “the loss of profits” due to substitution as “alarming”).
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These substitution actions have their roots in the old concept of
“passing off”—roughly understood to mean selling one’s own product
as that of another. In England, passing off was restrained in equity
before any legal cause of action was recognized by courts.152 Over the
nineteenth century, the common law of England and the United
States also developed a tort action for passing off, grounded in fraud
and leading to damages awards.153 In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, courts sitting in equity enjoined pharmacists
from passing (or “palming”) off when they substituted a different drug
for the one prescribed without identifying the substitution.154 They
also enjoined manufacturers of substituted drugs, finding that
imitation of trade dress (essentially, the overall appearance of the
product) or imitation or use of a brand name was unfair competition
because it encouraged pharmacists to engage in this practice.155
152. CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF: UNFAIR COMPETITION
8–9 (1990).
153. See id. at 26–29; see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:1 (5th ed. 2021).
154. E.g., Winthrop Chem. Co. v. Weinberg, 60 F.2d 461, 463 (3d Cir. 1932)
(directing lower court to issue preliminary injunction against defendant
pharmacist after concluding he had been “surreptitiously substituting a different
phenobarbital than the one ordered by the doctor” and noting that because
“Luminal commands a higher price than unbranded phenobarbital costs a
druggist, the purpose of the defendant . . . is clear”); Battle & Co. v. Finlay, 45 F.
796, 796 (C.C.E.D. La. 1891) (enjoining a manufacturing chemist from supplying
its own “medicinal preparation” in response to orders for the plaintiff’s
“Bromidia”).
155. E.g., Winthrop Chem. Co. v. Am. Pharm. Co., 94 F.2d 587, 588 (2d Cir.
1938) (granting preliminary injunction on a finding of unfair competition,
because defendant had been forced to stop using the plaintiff’s trademark with
its own product but then adopted a label that featured the same pink color with
the same active ingredient, identified in the same script as plaintiff’s trademark,
placed on a tube of the same size and shape as the plaintiff’s tube, “deliberately
for the purpose of enabling dealers who would do so to palm off the defendant’s
product for the plaintiff’s”); Pinoleum Co. v. Baron, 201 N.Y.S. 44, 44–45 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1923) (granting injunction to plaintiff, which marketed “Pinoleum” for
catarrh and which colored the product green to make it distinctive, because
defendant introduced a preparation of the same materials, which he called “Baco
Pinol Spray,” and which he colored green as well, with “ample” evidence that “he
made his preparation similar to the plaintiff’s for the purpose of making it
possible for druggists to use it, instead of Pinoleum, and that he sought to have
the druggists use it as such substitute and thereby defraud the consumer”);
Sterling Remedy Co. v. Spermine Med. Co., 112 F. 1000, 1003 (7th Cir. 1901)
(finding complainant entitled to an injunction on unfair competition grounds
when “defendant adopted the style and shape of the boxes, the color of the tablet,
and the letterpress upon the boxes and in advertising, to palm off his goods as
those of the complainant”); Sterling Remedy Co. v. Gorey, 110 F. 372, 373
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1901) (allowing defendant to sell tablets that are compounds of
cascara like plaintiff’s but ordering injunction because defendant prepared his
boxes and their contents so that “confusion would arise, which would result in
BY MISREPRESENTATION
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In the only case to reach the Court, the Court embraced this
unfair competition theory.156 Warner sold “Quin-Coco,” made of
quinine and chocolate, which was “incapable of being distinguished
by ordinary sight or taste” from Lilly’s Coco-Quinine, also containing
quinine and chocolate.157 The Court explained Warner’s efforts “were
directed not so much to showing the merits of [its] preparation as they
were to demonstrating its practical identity with Coco-Quinine, and,
since it was sold at a lower price, inducing the purchasing
druggist . . . to substitute . . . the former for the latter.”158 That is, the
company “sought to avail itself of the favorable repute which had been
established for” Lilly’s product.159 Warner’s agents “induced the
substitution, either in direct terms or by suggestion or insinuation.”160
The Court held that although Lilly had no patent or trademark, it had
the right to be “protected against unfair competition.”161
Today, unfair competition law—at both the state and federal
level—is a broad law of business torts that includes the tort of passing
off.162 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a cause of action for

the purchase of a box of the defendant’s medicine by one who had become
favorably disposed towards the use of the remedy introduced by the
complainant . . . for the purpose of taking unfair advantage of the
complainant . . . [and] of the established trade of the complainant”); C.F.
Simmons Med. Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co., 23 S.W. 165, 175 (Tenn. 1893)
(affirming injunction on the ground of unfair competition, defined as “consisting
of any device or trick whereby one manufacturer’s or dealer’s goods are palmed
off in the market as and for the goods of another, in fraud of the public and of the
persons whose goods are so displaced; the most usual of such devices being the
simulation of labels, the imitation of another’s style of putting up goods, and the
reproduction of the form, color, and general appearance of his packages”); Brown
Chem. Co. v. Frederick Stearns & Co., 37 F. 360, 363 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1889)
(finding plaintiff entitled to injunction given evidence that pharmacists
“endeavored to palm off” defendant’s drug as manufactured by plaintiff and
explaining the rule that “no man, however honest his personal intentions, has a
right to adopt and use so much of his rival’s established trademark as will enable
any dishonest trader into whose hands his own goods may come to sell them as
the goods of his rival” (citation omitted)).
156. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531–32 (1924).
157. Id. at 529.
158. Id. at 529–30.
159. Id. at 530.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 532.
162. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 153, § 25:1 (reporting that the rule against
passing off “remains an important part of the core” of unfair competition law
today); see also Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928)
(“The law of unfair trade comes down very nearly to this—as judges have
repeated again and again—that one merchant shall not divert customers from
another by representing what he sells as emanating from the second. This has
been, and perhaps even more now is, the whole Law and the Prophets on the
subject, though it assumes many guises.”).
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unfair trade practices, including misrepresenting one’s goods as those
of another (passing off).163 State common law usually permits unfair
competition suits, and some states have unfair competition statutes
similar to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.164
Modern trademark law—which emerged over the nineteenth
century at the state and then federal level—is derived in part from
the laws of passing off and unfair competition.165 Trademark law
protects a trademark—a word, for instance, or a symbol used to
distinguish a firm’s goods in the market and to signal their source.166
Trademarks can be registered under state or federal law (or both),
and unregistered trademarks may also be protected.167
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reliance on
trademark protection presented a risk for some drug makers. Some
courts found the invented names for medicines had become associated
with the products rather than their sources and thus concluded the
names had lost eligibility for protection as trademarks; they had
become “generic,” which is a term of art in trademark law.168 This

163. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (prohibiting false designations of origin and false
descriptions); Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982)
(White, J., concurring) (“[T]he purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify and unify
the common law of unfair competition and trademark protection.”).
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 (AM. L. INST. 1995)
(“Section 2(a) of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act . . . imposes liability
upon any person or commercial entity that ‘passes off goods or services as those
of another’ or ‘causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the
source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services.’ Passing off is
also prohibited under the various Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Acts.”).
165. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 5:2 (5th ed. 2021) (“Early [English] decisions often used the phrase
‘passing off’ or ‘palming off’ as synonyms for a competitor’s infringement of a
trademark.”); id. (“[I]n all cases where rights to the exclusive use of a trade-mark
are invaded, it is invariably held that the essence of the wrong consists in the
sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another; and that it
is only when this false representation is directly or indirectly made that the party
who appeals to a court of equity can have relief.” (quoting Lawrence Mfg. Co. v.
Tenn. Mfg. Co., 11 S. Ct. 396, 400 (1891))).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
167. Robert J. Kenney, United States: Protecting Unregistered Trademarks
Under Common Law and Unfair Competition, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (Sept. 1,
2017),
https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/portfolio-management/unitedstates-protecting-unregistered-trademarks-under-common-law-and.
168. E.g., Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(enjoining defendant from using “Aspirin” with manufacturing chemists, retail
druggists, and physicians, who understood the term referred to the plaintiff’s
product and understood the generic name, acetyl salicylic acid, but permitting
defendant to sell acetyl salicylic acid under the name “Aspirin” to consumers,
because these customers knew the drug by the name “Aspirin” and did not
associate it with a particular source); Centaur Co. v. Heinsfurter, 84 F. 955, 959
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was perhaps a greater risk for makers of patent medicines, as they
did not disclose their ingredients and thus provided no information
other than the fanciful names they had chosen.169 In contrast, a
company selling a drug listed in the U.S. Pharmacopeia used
ingredients specified in the compendium, and if it sold a newly
synthesized compound, it disclosed the contents on the label.170 To be
sure, some used fanciful names, such as “Dramamine” for a product
containing dimenhydrinate.171 But they also identified the active
ingredient by its chemical name or the shorter scientific name to keep
the brand name from falling into the public domain.172
Some drug trademarks were protected under the 1905 federal
law permitting registration of fanciful marks (made-up words) and
arbitrary marks (real words unrelated to the type of good).173 Today
they are protected by the Lanham Act, which established a coherent
and robust system for nationwide registration of trademarks and a
basis for the substantive law of trademark infringement.174 Many

(8th Cir. 1898) (declining to enjoin defendants from use of the word “Castoria” as
a trademark, because “the word ‘Castoria’ has become the one name by which
this medicine is generally known” and thus it is “the generic name by which the
article is known to the public”); id. at 956–57 (“The patent gave no right to any
particular name, but simply to the exclusive manufacture and sale. All such
rights expired in 1885, and from that time forth any party has had a right to
manufacture and sell that particular compound, and also a right to manufacture
and sell it under the name by which it has become generally known to the public;
and, if to that public the article has become generally known only by a single
name, that name must be considered as descriptive of the thing manufactured,
and not of the manufacturer.”).
169. See Swanson, supra note 70, at 353.
170. U.S. PHARMACOPEIA, NOMENCLATURE GUIDELINES 1–2 (2020),
https://www.usp.org/sites/default/files/usp/document/usp-nomenclatureguidelines.pdf.
171. FTC REPORT, supra note 117, at 27; Walter J. Derenberg, Some Unique
Features in the Selection and Protection of Pharmaceutical Trade-Marks, 4 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.Q. 137, 141–42 (1949) (discussing the use of “house marks”); see
also Greene, supra note 90, at 476 (noting that for the most part “the
pharmaceutical brand in the era of ethical marketing was an institutional brand,
not a product-specific brand”).
172. Greene, supra note 90, at 484–85; see also 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:23 (5th ed. 2021) (“A
term that is a generic name of an ingredient is not necessarily a generic name of
a product containing that ingredient.”).
173. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, Pub. L. No. 59-84, 34 Stat. 724, 724–26 (repealed
1946); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 165, § 5:3. An amendment in 1920
permitted registration of descriptive marks. Act of Mar. 19, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66162, 41 Stat. 533, 533–35 (repealed 1946).
174. See generally Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489,
60 Stat. 427. For examples of statutes in this coherent and robust system, see
also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (describing registrable trademarks); 15 U.S.C. § 1114
(describing liability of a person who infringes a registered trademark).
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states have trademark registration systems similar in scope and
design, and courts generally interpret the statutory provisions
similarly.175 Federal and state law permit actions for infringement of
registered trademarks, in which the trademark owner must show
purchasers are likely to be confused about the source, sponsorship, or
origin of the goods.176 In addition to seeking relief under trademark
law, a brand company can still use unfair competition law—section
43(a) of the Lanham Act or corresponding state law; the cases are
often described as infringement cases, and the underlying facts and
basic idea can be the same. 177
Trademark law also has roots in an equitable doctrine that
emerged separately from the common law action for passing off: a
doctrine grounded in infringement of property rights—tied to a firm’s
property interest in its trademark, its trade name, or its goodwill.178
Professor Mossoff argues that goodwill was recognized as a type of
property in the United States in the nineteenth century, citing Justice

175. See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 22:1.50 (5th ed. 2021) (collecting cases showing statute trademark
statutes are usually construed to be consistent with trademark provisions of
Lanham Act).
176. A typical case involving drugs today might involve a company with a
registered trademark for its drug asserting that another company’s use of a
similar name infringes its trademark. See, e.g., Kythera Biopharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Lithera, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 2d 890, 895–96 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (denying motion
to dismiss in a trademark infringement case where plaintiff was the owner of the
mark Kythera—which it associated with its lead product candidate designed to
reduce human body fat—and defendant was using Lithera in connection with
drugs for reducing the size and appearance of adipose deposits).
177. This was true both before and after enactment of the Lanham Act. For
instance, in the 1930s, Winthrop Chemical Company had valid trademarks for
five medicines, Veronal, Proargol, Theominal, Kres-lumin, and Aristol.
Blackman, and various other parties used similar names (such as
“Theobrominal”) as well as similar bottles and sometimes similar labels. The
New York Superior Court granted Winthrop a permanent injunction, writing that
“comparison of the two preparations leads to the inevitable conclusion that the
defendants attempted to make their article so closely resemble the plaintiff’s that
it could be easily palmed off on the public as the latter product.” Winthrop Chem.
Co. v. Blackman, 268 N.Y.S. 647, 658–59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934). “It is plain,” the
court added, “that the adoption of the word Theobrominal is for the purpose of
deception and confusion to the public and the detriment of the plaintiff.” Id. at
659. This was “unfair competition.” Id. at 651. Although the defendants had not
used Winthrop’s actual trademarks, equity would give “the same relief” as if they
had poached directly. Id. There had been “a studied, unfair effort on the part of
the defendants to obtain the benefit of the character and reputation of the
plaintiff’s products, without expense on their part, and to the detriment of the
public and the plaintiff alike.” Id.
178. See WADLOW, supra note 152, at 16. Indeed, the early injunction cases
reflected a property theory, as courts sitting in equity acted to protect property
rights. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 165, § 5:2.
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Story’s 1841 treatise on partnerships for the proposition that goodwill
is reputational value created by productive labor in the use of
resources.179 In England, passing off was explicitly reconceptualized
as a strict liability trespass on property rights in the early twentieth
century when courts acknowledged goodwill as a form of legal
property “uniquely liable to be damaged by the type of
misrepresentation which constituted passing-off.”180 Indications of
the property-rights justification for protection of trademarks could be
found in earlier English decisions but were not explicitly stated until
the early twentieth century.181
Although Professor Mossoff grounds trademark law in protection
of property rights, Professor Bone views trademark law’s primary
goal as the protection of consumers from deception and confusion.182
He sees a more recent shift to protection of goodwill and to property
theory and views it as improper.183 In contrast, Professor McKenna
argues that, like unfair competition law, trademark law was meant
to protect firms from wrongs committed by their competitors.184 He
sees trademark law’s historical basis as tied to property rights in the
mark and concerned with illegitimate diversion of trade.185 As a
descriptive matter, Professor McCarthy finds evidence of both
doctrinal bases in nineteenth century cases.186 The drug trademark
cases throughout the period covered by this Article reflect both
doctrinal bases,187 though there appears to be more emphasis on the
179. See Adam Mossoff, Trademark as a Property Right, 107 KY. L.J. 1, 4, 11,
15–16 (2018) (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS
§ 99 (1841)).
180. WADLOW, supra note 152, at 37.
181. See, e.g., id. at 29 n.108 (citing a “series of cases” in which Lord Westbury
L.C. held that “there was a right of property in trade marks which was
transmissible and enforceable even against innocent infringement”).
182. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill
in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 567 (2006).
183. See id. at 567–72, 616–21.
184. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841, 1843–45, 1848 (2007).
185. See id. at 1841, 1848.
186. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 165, § 5:2 (“In some of the early case
opinions, one finds both deception of the public and harm to the property of the
plaintiff mixed together as dual goals.”).
187. See, e.g., Clinton E. Worden & Co. v. Calif. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516,
528 (1903) (noting that a trademark owner seeking an injunction “to restrain the
defendant from injuring his property by making false representations to the
public” must not itself be guilty of false representations, in which case “no
property can be claimed on it, or, in other words, the right to the exclusive use of
it cannot be maintained”); Strey v. Devine’s, Inc., 217 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir.
1954) (“It must be remembered that the trade-mark laws and the law of unfair
competition are concerned not alone with the protection of a property right
existing in an individual, but also with the protection of the public from fraud
and deceit . . . .” (quoting Stahly, Inc. v. M. H. Jacobs Co., 183 F.2d 914, 917
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property rationale.188 Courts often remind readers that the property
right flows from use of the mark and the goodwill accumulated and
associated with the mark.189 Still, both doctrinal bases appear in the
cases, and this Article accepts the view that trademark law has dual
goals: protection of consumers from deception and protection of the
(1950))); Healthpoint, Ltd. v. River’s Edge Pharms., LLC, No. SA-03-CV-984,
2005 WL 356839, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2005) (“Section 43(a) is designed to
protect the rights of consumers to be told the truth, contrasted with the goal of
trademark law in general: protecting the property rights of trademark holders
against infringing competitors.”); Merrell-Nat’l Lab’ys, Inc. v. Zenith Laby’s, Inc.,
No. 76-2440, 1977 WL 22787, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 1997) (“[T]hough the goodwill
of an unpatented product or device is in the public domain . . . the goodwill, name
and reputation of the producer remain his private property and may not be traded
upon or exploited by his competitors.” (quoting Pezon et Michele v. Ernest R.
Hewin Assocs., Inc., 270 F. Supp. 423, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1967))), aff’d, 579 F.2d 786
(3d Cir. 1978); Regis v. J.A. Jaynes & Co., 70 N.E. 480, 482 (1904) (“While the
public are deceived, and buy the spurious production in the belief that the
imitation is the original article, yet the jurisdiction to award an injunction may
well rest on the ground that, where a substantial business has been built up, the
output of which has become known to buyers under a designated device or name,
such designation, when lawfully established, whether treated technically as a
trade-mark or tradename, is property in the same sense as the instrumentalities
which the owner uses in making the specific thing that he vends in the market
in this form. So that the proprietor of such a trade product, if another, without
authority, uses similar devices intending to represent by them that the goods are
identical, is entitled to protection from this wrongful and fraudulent
appropriation of his property.”).
188. See, e.g., Battle & Co. v. Finlay, 45 F. 796, 798 (C.C.E.D. La. 1891) (“[I]t
seems to be clear that the defendants are appropriating complainants’ property
without their consent, and to their damage.”); C.F. Simmons Med. Co. v.
Mansfield Drug Co., 23 S.W. 165, 174 (Tenn. 1893) (“The right to acquire property
in a trademark by use upon vendible commodities of some mark, symbol, sign, or
word, susceptible of being used as such, is a common-law right, and the property
so acquired is always protected by courts of equity in a proper case.”); Mauger v.
Dick, 55 How. Pr. 132, 135 (N.Y. Super. 1878) (“Equitable jurisdiction to restrain
the use of a name or a trade-mark or letters, rests upon the ground of plaintiff’s
property in his name, trade-mark or letters, and of the unlawful use thereof.”);
Gilman v. Hunnewell, 122 Mass. 139, 147–48 (Mass. 1875) (“The right in a trademark, so applied, is recognized as property, which a court of chancery will protect
by injunction.”).
189. See, e.g., Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F.
468, 471 (8th Cir. 1901) (“A word, symbol, or device, to be a valid trade-mark
constituting a right of property, must have been used by the owner in connection
with the sale of his goods for such length of time, and under such circumstances,
as indicates to the trade that the goods in connection with which it appears are
his goods, as distinguished from those of other manufacturers or dealers.”);
W.W.W. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Gillette Co., 808 F. Supp. 1013, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(“Property rights in a trademark are limited to the trademark’s use in connection
with a business; they are not inherent ownership rights . . . .”), aff’d, 984 F.2d 567
(2d Cir. 1993); Mossoff, supra note 179, at 4 (characterizing the trademark as a
use-based property right derived from a separate property right in goodwill).
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property rights of the mark owner.190 It also treats these goals as
procompetitive: the trademark facilitates informed and efficient
product selection in the marketplace, and protection of the trademark
encourages market participants to invest in their reputations and the
quality of their products.
II. ILLEGAL SUBSTITUTION AND ITS REMEDIES IN THE MIDCENTURY
In the middle of the twentieth century, substitution by
pharmacists became commonplace. The brand companies increased
their use of unfair competition law and trademark law, challenging
both the pharmacists who substituted and the companies whose
cheaper products were dispensed. Eventually, the companies sought
a more efficient solution: reinforcement of the pharmacy laws and
enforcement by government instead. The new pharmacy laws
reflected the marriage in policymaking of the historical bases for
opposition to substitution: concerns about economic adulteration—
economic fraud on the pharmacy’s part and possible risk to patients
tied to inferior products—and complaints about competitive harm (to
the companies whose products were specified by the consumer).
A.

Explosion of Illegal Substitution

At least three factors contributed to the rampant illegal
substitution by pharmacists in the midcentury: the lack of a
premarket approval requirement for new drugs, evolution in the role
of the pharmacist (especially after a 1951 amendment to the FDCA),
and the therapeutic revolution after World War II.
First, in the decades after enactment of the FDCA in 1938, many
purported copies of drugs came to market without premarket FDA
review.191 The statute required submission of a new drug application
for a “new drug”—meaning a drug not “generally recognized” as “safe”
for the uses described in its labeling.192 But it did not require FDA
190. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 165, § 5:2; see also Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives
Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.14 (1982) (“Such blatant trademark
infringement inhibits competition and subverts both goals of the Lanham Act.
By applying a trademark to goods produced by one other than the trademark’s
owner, the infringer deprives the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy,
time, and money to obtain. . . . At the same time, the infringer deprives
consumers of their ability to distinguish among the goods of competing
manufacturers.”).
191. Shelby Bird, Note, Don’t Try This at Home: The FDA’s Restrictive
Regulation of Home-Testing Devices, 67 DUKE L.J. 383, 389–90 (2017).
192. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 87-781,
§§ 102(a)(1)–(2), 52 Stat. 1040, 1041 (1962) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
321(p)) (defining “new drug”); id. § 104(a), 52 Stat. at 1052 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)) (requiring new drug applications). The statute required
only safety data—not proof of effectiveness—in an NDA. Id. § 102(b), 52 Stat. at
1052 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)). A new drug could reach the
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approval before market entry. Instead, the NDA took effect
automatically sixty days after filing, unless denied by the agency.193
Moreover, only new drugs required premarket applications, so any
drug that was generally recognized as safe could be marketed without
an application.194 In the years that followed, once one company’s
NDA took effect, other companies brought copies and similar products
to market without applications, reasoning that the effective NDA
meant their product no longer constituted a “new drug.”195 Although
most of these products purported to contain the same active
ingredient, they were not always exact copies. For instance, some had
different dosage forms or different routes of administration. The FDA
called these “identical, related, or similar” drugs.196
Second, by the middle of the twentieth century, pharmacists had
lost some autonomy and power. At first they had not only
compounded medicines on receipt of a prescription but also provided
medical advice and compounded treatments of their own choosing.197
Medicines were not delivered in finished forms, ready for dispensing,
until the middle of the twentieth century.198 And, although the FDCA
as originally enacted in 1938 acknowledged the existence of a class of
drugs that would be dispensed only on prescription, it did not create
or define the class.199 Nor did the FDA have the power to dictate the
status of any particular medicine, which meant the seller decided
whether the sales should only occur by prescription. The same
compound might be sold directly to patients by one company or
pharmacist and only on prescription by another.200
market without an application only if it was grandfathered (the same as a pre1938 drug). Id. §§ 102(a)(1)–(2), 52 Stat. at 1041–42.
193. Id. §§ 102(c), 104(b), 52 Stat. at 1052 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 355(c)–(d)).
194. Id. §§ 102(a)(1)–(2), 52 Stat. at 1041–42.
195. Some companies reached this conclusion themselves, while others relied
on written opinions from the FDA, known as “old drug opinions.” Drugs for
Human Use, 40 Fed. Reg. 26142, 26143 (June 20, 1975) (to be codified as 21
C.F.R. pt. 130).
196. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF AND INDUSTRY:
MARKETED UNAPPROVED DRUGS—COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 9 (2011),
https://www.fda.gov/media/71004/download.
197. See Dominique A. Tobbell, “Eroding the Physician’s Control of Therapy”:
The Postwar Politics of the Prescription, in PRESCRIBED: WRITING, FILLING, USING,
AND ABUSING THE PRESCRIPTION IN MODERN AMERICA 66, 66–67 (Jeremy A. Greene
& Elizabeth Siegel Watkins eds., 2012).
198. See SILVERMAN & LEE, supra note 58, at 193 (noting that before World
War I, ninety percent of prescription orders required a pharmacist to compound,
and that by the early 1960s, companies delivered finished products to
pharmacies).
199. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, §
201(g), 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938).
200. See Nancy Tomes, The Great American Medicine Show Revisited, 79
BULL. HIST. MED. 627, 633 (2005) (noting drugs sold on prescriptions were also
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In 1951, Congress amended the FDCA to specify circumstances
under which a drug would be limited to prescription sales.201 Without
a preapproval requirement, the FDA did not yet act as a gatekeeper
to the market, so companies often made the decision themselves, at
least in the first instance.202 But putting the selection of medicines
in the hands of doctors—making them the gatekeepers—transformed
the marketplace.203 It made promotion directly to doctors more
important, which led to greater emphasis on the brand name.204 The
FDA used its new authority to ensure that the same active ingredient
was not sold both by prescription and over the counter.205 With these
changes, doctors and the FDA gained power, and pharmacists lost
power.
Third, the therapeutic revolution of the midcentury challenged
pharmacists, who found themselves stocking more drugs on their
shelves in anticipation of prescriptions from doctors. The first
modern medicines—sulfa drugs and steroids—had emerged in the
1930s.206 Sulfanilamide led to other antibiotics, and tranquilizers
emerged soon after.207 By the 1950s, researchers were identifying an
astonishing stream of new molecular entities that would change the
practice of medicine and pharmacy. In the 1950s, the FDA received
applications for antibiotics, steroids, blood pressure medications,
anti-arrhythmic agents, cancer drugs, heart disease medications, and
at the end of the decade, the first oral contraceptive.208 And still, once
one company secured an NDA, other companies launched competing
versions without seeking premarket review by the FDA. As the FTC

available directly to consumers); see also Sidney H. Willig, Ethical and Legal
Implications of Drug Substitution, 23 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 284, 286 (1968)
(noting that “problems in uniformity of labeling between manufacturers of the
same drug” and “desire for clear statutory determination” laid the groundwork
for enactment of prescription standard).
201. See generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No.
82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (1951).
202. See Tomes, supra note 200, at 633.
203. See id. at 635; see also Tobbell, supra note 197, at 66–67.
204. Tomes, supra note 200, at 635.
205. Section 503(b)(3) authorized the FDA to “by regulation remove drugs”
from the prescription requirements in § 503(b)(1) “when such requirements are
not necessary for the protection of the public health.” Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648, 649 (1951). The FDA
used rulemaking to switch more than two dozen ingredients that had been
marked “prescription” by some manufacturers, beginning with acetaminophen in
1955. See generally Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 20 Fed. Reg. 3499 (May 19, 1955).
206. Tomes, supra note 200, at 634.
207. FTC REPORT, supra note 117, at 16.
208. Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History,
in A QUICK GUIDE TO CLINICAL TRIALS 21, 34–35 (Madhu Davies & Faiz Kermani
eds., 2008).
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wrote later, the market in the 1950s was flooded with products that
were “resembling the popular brand-name product in color, size,
shape, and sometimes packaging, but of unknown quality, content
and origin.”209 Pharmacists complained about the financial and
physical burden of stocking more than one drug in the same
therapeutic class.210
These three factors worked together; even though doctors often
prescribed by brand name, many pharmacists chose to substitute,
providing one of the “identical, related, or similar” drugs that reached
the market without FDA review.211 The FDA expressed concern after
investigations showed variations in the contents and quality of these
unregulated duplicates.212 But pharmacists paid less for these
substitutes and thus benefitted financially from the practice.213
Although organized pharmacy opposed substitution, they saw it as a
natural reaction to the proliferation of choices produced by drug
companies.214 Substitution, though illegal, was widespread.215
209. FTC REPORT, supra note 117, at 6.
210. See TOBBELL, supra note 54, at 63.
211. See supra note 196 and accompanying text; Facchinetti & Dickson, supra
note 41, at 469 (calling it a generic); TOBBELL, supra note 54, at 64
(“[P]harmacists were engaging in the practice of substituting cheaper generic
drugs for brand-name prescription drugs.”); SILVERMAN & LEE, supra note 58, at
142–43 (“[A] number of important drugs—most still under patent—were facing
competition from black-market products . . . [which] shaped, colored, and labeled
exactly like the legitimate drugs [and] were generally priced far less to
pharmacists . . . .”). Some evidence suggests that pharmacists substituted not
only purported copies but also drugs with different active ingredients. Bruce
Alan Berger, Drug Product Selection: A Study of Ohio’s Law and Pharmacist’s
Perceptions 8 (1978) (Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University) (ProQuest).
212. See N.E. Cook, How the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Applies to
the Pharmacist, 8 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 327, 331 (1953) (reporting, as an FDA
inspector, that “in too many cases we have investigated, the imitation product
was seriously deficient in claimed potency or otherwise adulterated—in short, it
represented not just an imposition on the rights of the manufacturer of the
genuine article, but could seriously affect the patient”).
213. Hammer, supra note 149, at 777.
214. Tobbell, supra note 197, at 69 (“[E]ven as pharmacy leaders in the
American Pharmaceutical Association, the National Association of Boards of
Pharmacy, the American College of Apothecaries, and the National Conference
on State Pharmaceutical Associations condemned substitution, they perceived it
to be a symptom of the drug industry’s economic practices . . . .”); Facchinetti &
Dickson, supra note 41, at 471 (noting that the American Pharmaceutical
Association (APhA) resolved in 1952 and again in several subsequent years to
“condemn as unethical the dispensing of a pharmaceutical preparation or brand
thereof other than that ordered or prescribed” and that the NABP, American
College of Apothecaries, and National Conference of State Pharmaceutical
Associations agreed).
215. In 1952, one firm reported that substitution on its major products was
about twelve percent and as high as thirty-eight percent in New York.
Facchinetti & Dickson, supra note 41, at 469–70. The following year more than

W03_LIETZAN

980
B.

(DO NOT DELETE)

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

1/10/22 8:32 PM

[Vol. 56

Drug Industry Response

Lawyers inside and outside the companies urged the industry to use
unfair competition law to challenge illegal substitution, laying out the
theory in articles and speeches.216 Writing in 1951, for example, an
attorney from drug-maker Smith, Kline & French (“SKF”) identified
the pharmacist as the “perpetrator” of the “unethical” practice of
substitution and laid the ultimate blame at the feet of the
“unscrupulous manufacturer” of the replacement product.217 He
urged others to consider unfair competition claims against competing
manufacturers if the prescribed products had “distinctive
nonfunctional features”—effectively, a trademark—and unfair
competition claims in every case “against the retailer who actually
fills a prescription calling for the original product with the
substitution.”218 Another attorney explained that imitation and
substitution fell within the law of passing off.219 That is, where a
competitor in dressing his goods has so imitated the goods of another
with intent to deceive to the extent that the public generally cannot
easily distinguish between them and retailers are placed in a position
where they can readily ‘palm off’ the product as the goods of the other,
an action will lie against the sale of such products to retailers by
producers and by retailers to consumers.220 Although substitution
damaged the manufacturer’s goodwill,221 the SKF attorney viewed
substitution as a business tort rather than a trespass to property,
writing that passing off is “part and parcel of unfair competitive
practices” which are “irrespective of a trespass upon any exclusive
right of the producer.”222
half the brand manufacturers surveyed stated substitution was widespread or
becoming so. Id. at 469.
216. A lawyer at Upjohn suggested another business tort: “unjustifiable
inference with reasonable business expectations.” Murray D. Welch, Jr.,
Substitution–Another Possible String to the Bow, 12 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 289,
289 (1957). He explained, “it is a civil wrong for a person to intentionally and
unjustifiably deprive another of a reasonable business expectancy even in the
absence of an existing contract.” Id.
217. Hammer, supra note 149, at 775 (“This manufacturer of substitute
products is the real instigator of the whole fraudulent process, as his distribution
of imitation products that can be passed off for well-known brands places in the
hands of the druggist the instrument of fraud.”).
218. Id. at 778–79.
219. See Joseph H. Stamler, Some Legal Aspects of the Substitution Problem,
8 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 643, 645 (1953).
220. Id. at 646.
221. Cf. Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 1939)
(contrasting the products at issue with a “drug preparation” as to which “the
efficiency of the drug depends largely upon the capacity of the maker” and “the
purchaser would care more about the personality behind the drug than the drug
itself”).
222. Stamler, supra note 219, at 646.
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The defending companies sought to shift the blame to the
pharmacists, arguing that they had not deceived the retailers and
that they had not explicitly invited the retailers to substitute their
products for any others.223 These arguments failed because it was
well settled that one “who induces another to commit a fraud and
furnishes the means is equally guilty with the[] one who actually
perpetrates the fraud.”224 The Third Circuit, for instance, found the
features of one SKF product—including its beveled edges, scoring,
and heart shape—functional, which precluded arguments grounded
in trademark or trade dress infringement.225 But the defendants had
also suggested that prescriptions for the plaintiff’s tablets be filled
with their own tablets.226 The court stated that SKF was “entitled to
the reputation which its goods have acquired” and the public was
“entitled to a means of distinguishing between” the plaintiff’s tablets
and those of the defendants.227 The court explained that the “unfair
competition” consisted in “the unfair and fraudulent advantage taken
by the defendants . . . to pass off their product” as that of the
plaintiff.228 Brand companies routinely secured injunctions against

223. One brand industry lawyer explained: these companies “realize that the
bald statement that their product X can be substituted on prescription for the
well-known product Y because the physical characteristics of the two products
are virtually indistinguishable gives the manufacturer of well-known Y excellent
evidence against them for an unfair competition suit.” Hammer, supra note 149,
at 776. See also, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 259–62 (2d Cir. 1957)
(remanding for entry of injunction because defendant distributed printed cards
containing a list of its products next to the names of similar products made by
Upjohn, concluding that “the cards in question when distributed to druggists and
pharmacists were to be used as guides for substitution and that defendant
intended such use”). The companies therefore relied on innuendo. In one unfair
competition lawsuit, for instance, a judge asked the substitute manufacturer if it
“ever told druggists that his product could be substituted for another.” Hammer,
supra note 149, at 776. The answer was no; “[m]y product speaks for itself.” Id.
224. Oneida, Ltd., v. Nat'l Silver Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 271, 276 (Sup. Ct. 1940); see
also Smith, Kline & French Lab’ys v. Midwest Chem. Dev. Corp., 96 F. Supp. 797,
799 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (rejecting argument that the retailer was not deceived,
because under theories of contributory infringement or contributory unfair
competition “[a] manufacturer, who places into the hands of his immediate
purchaser, goods which he knows may cause deception, is liable for unfair
competition”).
225. Smith, Kline & French Lab’ys v. Clark & Clark., 157 F.2d 725, 730 (3d
Cir. 1946).
226. Id. at 731.
227. Id.
228. Id. The defendants would be enjoined from making and selling the active
ingredient until SKF’s patent expired, after which SKF would be entitled to a
decree “enjoining the palming off of the defendants’ product” as that of the
plaintiff. Id.
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manufacturers of the imitation products dispensed by pharmacists.229
Only a minority of courts ruled the other way.230
Midcentury courts also found the pharmacists liable. In 1957, for
instance, a federal court in Alabama enjoined pharmacist Kathlynn
Fadeley from infringing A.H. Robins’ trademark “Donetal” and from
“substituting and passing off the product of another for the product of
[Robins] when selling, offering for sale or filling prescriptions, upon
calls for any product of [Robins].”231 The next year, a federal court in

229. E.g., Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Lab’ys, 207 F.2d 190,
193, 196–97, 199 (9th Cir. 1953) (affirming preliminary injunction in action for
unfair competition when defendant marketed its dextroamphetamine sulfate
tablet in identical size, shape, and color as plaintiff’s tablet, “in an effort to
develop a distinctive tablet which would point to SKF as the manufacturer
without actually putting SKF’s initials on the tablet,” so that “no label could
prevent unethical pharmacists from substituting [their] tablets for SKF’s without
detection and to the deceit of the prescribing doctor and his patient”); Smith Kline
& French Lab’ys v. Broder, No. 12707, 1959 WL 6882, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2,
1959) (“Defendant’s conduct in advertising and furnishing retail druggists with
drug products imitating the appearance and dosages of plaintiff’s products, and
deliberately and willfully suggesting and inviting retail druggists to palm-off and
substitute said imitation products for the products of plaintiff, constitutes unfair
competition, entitling plaintiff to injunctive relief.”); Smith, Kline & French
Lab’ys. v. Midwest Chem. Dev. Corp., 96 F. Supp. 797, 799 (N.D. Ohio 1951)
(denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment because a “manufacturer,
who places into the hands of his immediate purchaser, goods which he knows
may cause deception, is liable for unfair competition”); Smith, Kline & French
Lab’ys v. Lipton, No. 28130, 1951 WL 4627, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 24, 1951)
(issuing preliminary injunction, based on plaintiff’s allegation that “defendant
manufactures and markets dextro-amphetamine sulfate tablets of curved edge,
triangular form, and of orange color in close imitation of plaintiff’s dextroamphetamine sulfate tablets, intending thereby to enable druggists to palm off
and substitute defendant’s imitation tablets for those of plaintiff which are sold
under plaintiff’s trade name ‘DEXEDRINE’”); Smith, Kline & French Lab’ys v.
Heart Pharm. Corp., 90 F. Supp. 976, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (granting preliminary
injunction and quoting the Supreme Court: “That no deception was practiced on
the retail dealers, and that they knew exactly what they were getting, is of no
consequence. The wrong was in designedly enabling the dealers to palm off the
preparation as that of the . . . [plaintiff]. . . . One who induces another to commit
a fraud and furnishes the means of consummating it is equally guilty and liable
for the injury.” (quoting William R. Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526,
530–31 (1924))).
230. E.g., Smith, Kline & French Lab’ys v. Waldman, 69 F. Supp. 646, 649–
50 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (declining preliminary injunction in part because “sharing in
the good will of another is not unfair unless the passing off of one’s goods as those
of another is shown” and in part because there was no evidence of intent to
defraud the ultimate purchaser). This was an early case, however, and later
courts would not require proof passing off had occurred. See supra note 229.
231. See A.H. Robins Co. v. Fadely, 299 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1962)
(discussing the lower court injunction in an appeal of a lower court dismissal of a
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New York found that two pharmacists “willfully and intentionally
competed unfairly with” the Upjohn Company, by infringing its
registered trademarks “by substituting and passing off products other
than” Upjohn’s products when the latter were called for by the use of
those trademarks.232 Upjohn was entitled to an injunction and the
pharmacists’ profits.233
C.

Reinforcement of Pharmacy Law

Although brand company unfair competition suits generally
succeeded, these companies found the cases required “considerable
explanation” because the situations were “usually novel to the trial
courts.”234 The suits were also, according to one company lawyer,
“prohibitively expensive and time consuming.”235 Moreover, even
though a company could obtain an injunction against the
manufacturer of the substitute, “another would quickly appear to
take his place.”236 Litigation against the substituting pharmacists
met with “the same unsatisfactory results.”237
To remedy these issues, twelve brand companies joined with
pharmacists to form the National Pharmaceutical Council (“NPC”) in
December 1953.238 The NPC focused on addressing the manufacture
and substitution of imitations of brand drugs.239 They met with
pharmacy boards, state pharmacy associations, and pharmacy
students, and they also gathered evidence of substitution and asked

petition for an order to show cause why Fadeley should not be found in contempt
of the consent decree).
232. E.g., Upjohn Co. v. Katz, No. CIV.A. 117-35, 1958 WL 6110, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1958) (“Defendants [who are pharmacists] have willfully and
intentionally competed unfairly with plaintiff and infringed plaintiff’s registered
trademarks CHERACOL, ZYMACAP, and CORTEF by substituting and passing
off products other than plaintiff’s products on prescriptions or calls for plaintiff’s
products by the use of each of said trademarks.”); see also TOBBELL, supra note
54, at 65 (reporting Abbott Laboratories secured a series of injunctions against
New York pharmacists in the 1950s).
233. See Upjohn Co., 1958 WL 6110, at *2.
234. Hammer, supra note 149, at 779.
235. John J. Galbally, Substitution as “Gross Immorality,” 12 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 758, 758 (1957).
236. Id.; see also Stamler, supra note 219, at 654.
237. Galbally, supra note 235, at 758.
238. Facchinetti & Dickson, supra note 41, at 470–71; see also TOBBELL, supra
note 54, at 66 (quoting the first NPC president, who called for industry to “bring
our combined influence to bear against those practices that are undermining the
ethical principles of fair competition and fair dealing” and who committed to
“squashing the practice of substitution and pharmacists’ antiduplication drive”).
239. TOBBELL, supra note 54, at 67; Facchinetti & Dickson, supra note 41, at
471.
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pharmacy boards to act.240 Though surely motivated mainly by
competitive concerns—unfair competition and damage to their
goodwill—with this audience they focused on pharmacy ethics and
consumer safety.241 Organized pharmacy was receptive: many
pharmacists believed substitution “violated the ethics of the
profession and community.”242 And pharmacists still had a strong
commercial interest in preventing substitution.243
By 1956, most state boards of pharmacy opposed substitution and
acted when incidents were drawn to their attention.244 They did so
whether or not state law expressly prohibited substitution.245 But the
NPC also wanted to ensure that state law expressly prohibited
substitution, so it drafted model legislation to prohibit “pharmacists
from dispensing not only a different drug entity, but a different brand
from the one prescribed.”246 Thanks to the work of the NPC, most
states had express prohibitions in their pharmacy laws by the end of
the 1950s.247 Brand companies invoked these laws through the 1960s
to address the sale of substitute and imitation products when doctors
had specified their products by name.248
III. AN EXCEPTION FOR MODERN GENERIC DRUGS
State and federal antisubstitution policy faced pressure in the
1960s. The 1962 amendments to the FDCA revolutionized the new

240. TOBBELL, supra note 54, at 67; Facchinetti & Dickson, supra note 41, at
471.
241. TOBBELL, supra note 54, at 67 (quoting an NPC speech in 1954 saying a
“pharmacist is professionally, morally, and legally bound to fill that prescription
precisely as the doctor wrote it”).
242. GREENE, supra note 148, at 138; see also Galbally, supra note 235, at 758–
59, 761 (arguing in 1957 that substitution constitutes “gross immorality,” which
is often a basis for suspension or revocation of the pharmacist’s license, also
arguing that it violates an obligation of fair dealing).
243. Facchinetti & Dickson, supra note 41, at 471.
244. TOBBELL, supra note 54, at 67.
245. Id.; Facchinetti & Dickson, supra note 41, at 473 (noting pharmacy
literature of the 1950s indicates boards took action against substitution
regardless of any explicit statutory language).
246. FTC REPORT, supra note 117, at 6–7; see also Welch, supra note 216, at
289 (discussing the “model antisubstituition act” put forward by the Drug,
Chemical, and Allied Trade Section of the New York Board of Trade, which
defined substitution as “substituting a different drug, brand of drug, or drug
product of a different manufacturer or distributor for any drug, brand of drug, or
drug product ordered by prescription or otherwise”).
247. Silverman and Lee reported every state legislature that had not already
expressly prohibited substitution had now done so, with Alaska, Missouri, and
D.C. being the last holdouts. See SILVERMAN & LEE, supra note 58, at 143. Greene
says that by the end of the 1950s, forty-five of fifty states expressly prohibited
substitution. GREENE, supra note 148, at 141.
248. Willig, supra note 200, at 303.
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drug regulatory paradigm and made premarket research and
development riskier, more time consuming, and more expensive.249
Insurance coverage for prescription drugs became more common, and
payors—including public payors—developed a stake in the cost of
medicines. Concern about drug prices and the brand loyalty of doctors
led to suggestions that prescribers write prescriptions specifying only
the active ingredient desired.250 State pharmacy law would then
allow the pharmacist to dispense any drug with that active
ingredient.251 Improvements in regulatory science eventually meant
that generic drugs were reliably bioequivalent to brand drugs, and
pharmacists stopped opposing substitution. Although efforts to
mandate “generic prescribing” (prescribing by active ingredient)
failed, the FDA and the FTC—along with payors, pharmacists, and
consumer groups—instead pushed for a generic drug exception to the
state law prohibition on substitution by pharmacists.252
A.

Generic Prescribing

After enactment of the statutory prescription standard in 1951,
doctors took a more visible role as intermediaries between drug
companies and patients. Some argued that doctors preferred brand
drugs to less expensive copies because brand advertising was clouding
their judgment.253 Reformers in the middle of the century urged
federal agencies and Congress to investigate the brand industry’s
advertising practices, and they pushed for “generic prescribing”—that
is, they wanted doctors to write prescriptions stating only an active
ingredient and dose rather than a brand name (which would specify
a particular company’s product).254 In their view, a “partial remedy”
to the problem of high drug prices would come through
“discontinuation of the common practice of relying upon brand names

249. Erika Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 39, 52–54
(2018); see also Reid, supra note 59, at 315 (suggesting higher prices of new drugs
that had gone through the more robust post-1962 approval process influenced
state legislators to reconsider anti-substitution policy).
250. See TOBBELL, supra note 54, at 163–64 (explaining that there were efforts
in the 1960s and 1970s to require doctors to prescribe a generic drug if it was
available).
251. See id.
252. Id. at 164 (“[C]oalition of pharmacists, consumer and patient groups, and
state legislators . . . .”); id. at 190 (asserting that “pharmaceutical reformers
achieved success at the state level . . . in part [due to] . . . the political motivation
of states to reduce the economic burden of rising Medicaid costs”); Facchinetti &
Dickson, supra note 41, at 468 (attributing laws of the 1970s to a “coalition”
including consumer-advocate groups and third-party payors of prescriptions, who
saw the “economic advantages” of the laws).
253. Tomes, supra note 200, at 653.
254. TOBBELL, supra note 54, at 163–64.
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for identification of drugs.”255 The pharmacists who resented stocking
more than one drug with the same active ingredient agreed that
doctors should be encouraged, or even required, to specify the active
ingredient rather than any particular company’s product containing
that active ingredient.256 The brand companies perceived this as an
attack on the trademark, responding that “‘by plugging the use of
generic names on [prescriptions],’ pharmacists were verging on
‘destroying the value of pharmaceutical trademarks.’”257
The idea caught hold, however, and various changes to the
statute in 1962 were meant to encourage a shift to generic
prescribing. The Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee,
chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN), began hearings in
December 1959 on “administered prices in the ethical drug
industry.”258 In April 1961, Senator Kefauver introduced draft
legislation to reform both the drug regulatory statute and the
application of patent law and antitrust law to the brand companies.259
The subcommittee concluded that the brand industry enjoyed
“exceptionally high profits.”260 It attributed these profits to market
control and blamed advertising and promotional practices that
persuaded doctors to prescribe products by brand name.261 Senator
Kefauver’s proposed legislation would address these issues, he said,
commenting that the brand companies invest in advertising and
255. RICHARD BURACK, THE HANDBOOK OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OFFICIAL
NAMES, PRICES, AND SOURCES FOR PATIENT AND DOCTOR, at viii (1967); see also
TOBBELL, supra note 54, at 163–64.
256. TOBBELL, supra note 54, at 64.
Various professional pharmacy
organizations adopted resolutions encouraging doctors to prescribe by generic
name. Facchinetti & Dickson, supra note 41, at 472. Some proposed physicians
add “ARB” (“any reliable brand”) on their prescriptions, though others disagreed.
See, e.g., “ARB” Is Threat to Fair Trade, NC Pharm Assn Declares, 129 AM.
DRUGGIST 12, 12 (1954).
257. Tobbell, supra note 197, at 70 (internal citation omitted).
258. 107 CONG. REC. S5638 (1961) (statement of Sen. Estes Kefauver).
259. See generally S. 1552, 87th Cong. (1961).
260. 107 CONG. REC. S5639 (1961) (statement of Sen. Estes Kefauver); see also
Jeremy A. Greene & Scott H. Podolsky, Reform, Regulation, and
Pharmaceuticals: The Kefauver Harris Amendments at 50, NEW ENG. J. MED.
(Oct. 18, 2012), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmp1210007; Robert
Pitofsky, Book Review, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 816, 817 (1965).
261. 107 CONG. REC. S5639 (1961) (“The subcommittee’s studies have revealed
high prices and exceptionally high profits. It appears clear that these result from
control over the market and the manner in which that control is exercised.
Although there are many factors involved, the principal sources of market control
seem to be first, patent control; second, the extensive and costly advertising and
promotion costs directed to physicians; and third, the persuasion of doctors to
prescribe by brand names rather than generic names.”); S. REP. NO. 87-448, at
105 (1961); see also Harry A. Sweeney, Jr., The “Generic Every Time” Case:
Prescription Drug Industry in Extremis, 21 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 226, 238
(1966).
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promotion “for the purpose of persuading the doctors to prescribe by
trade name instead of by generic name.”262 Although he would have
permitted brand companies to use brand names, he noted that generic
names were “too long and difficult to use” and proposed that the FDA
be given power to establish nonproprietary names, “thereby providing
a means of simplifying generic names which, in contrast to the short
and simple tradenames, are often so long, complex, and
unpronounceable that they cannot possibly be remembered or used by
physicians.”263 He also proposed that the drug’s label include the
nonproprietary name in type “at least as large and prominent” as
used for the brand name.264 As the legislation wound its way through
Congress in 1962, President Kennedy wrote in support of the
proposal, explaining the goal was to “encourage physicians to
prescribe drugs by nonproprietary name rather than by brand
name.”265
These proposals were controversial, and five senators signed a
scathing dissent to the subcommittee report.266 The bill also met with
opposition from organized medicine and academic doctors, as well as
brand companies, which defended the brand name as associated with
the quality of the drug and the reputation of the manufacturer.267
Although more radical aspects of Senator Kefauver’s proposal—such
as the proposal to limit drug patents to three years268—were
262. 107 CONG. REC. S5638 (1961) (statement of Sen. Estes Kefauver).
263. Id. at 5642; S. 1552, 87th Cong. § 509(a) (1961); see also S. REP. NO. 87448, at 231 (1961).
264. S. 1552, 87th Cong. § 4(a)(3) (1961).
265. 107 CONG. REC. S10105 (June 11, 1962) (letter to Sen. James O. Eastland
from President John F. Kennedy).
266. See S. REP. NO. 87-448, at 263–369 (1961). These Senators considered
the majority report a “mimeographed monstrosity which . . . appears to be
nothing more than a calculated review of choice quips, statements, and exhibits
presented by biased witnesses whose views were well known to the majority at
the time they were called to testify.” Id. at 263. They also pointed out the
subcommittee had “no jurisdiction to review the trademark laws of the United
States or to determine whether generic names should be used in lieu of brand
names in prescriptions.” Id. at 359. A small group of doctors “proposed that all
brand names in the drug field be eliminated and, instead, doctors be required to
write their prescriptions in generic terms.” Id. at 360. But the U.S. economy is
founded on the notion that “a job well done has its proper reward.” Id. Moreover,
if products are sold under their generic names, “all drug standards will
immediately drop to the lowest” standards, because an “attempt to exceed these
standards will be fruitless, as there will be no reward for those who make an
extra effort to do so.” Id.
267. Tobbell, supra note 197, at 74–75. Despite opposing Kefauver’s proposal,
the American Medical Association encouraged doctors to prescribe generic drugs
for “welfare patients” for economic reasons. Id. at 76.
268. S. 1552, 87th Cong. § 3(d)(2) (1961) (“Every patent for a drug issued after
the effective date of this paragraph shall contain a grant to the patentee, his heirs
or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling that drug
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abandoned, President Kennedy signed a final amended version of
Senator Kefauver’s legislation into law in October 1962.269
The provisions meant to encourage generic prescribing remained
essentially the same. The FDA received power to designate a
nonproprietary name for a drug if doing so would serve the interests
of “usefulness and simplicity.”270 Further, a drug’s nonproprietary
name would need to be printed prominently and in type at least half
as large as used for the brand name of the drug.271 The FDA’s
implementing regulation, which required the nonproprietary name to
accompany the brand name everywhere the latter was used, provoked
an immediate lawsuit from the brand companies.272 The companies
perceived the regulation as yet another attack on drug trademarks,
explaining that “brand names indicate the manufacturers’
willingness to stand behind the quality and purity of their products”
and that the agency’s regulation undermined the value of the
trademark.273
B.

Improvements in Regulatory Science

In the decades after the 1962 amendments, the FDA developed a
sophisticated regulatory framework for assessing whether two drug
products with the same active ingredient are likely to have the same
clinical effect in the body. Three aspects of the 1962 amendments

for the term of three years from its effective date, and for any additional period
(not exceeding fourteen years) during which the holder thereof grants to each
qualified applicant an unrestricted license to make, use, and sell that drug.”).
269. See generally Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat.
780. Interest in generic prescribing continued. See Greene, supra note 90, at
490–95 (discussing a subsequent series of bills intended to encourage generic
prescribing); see also Tobbell, supra note 197, at 78.
270. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 111(a), 76 Stat. 780,
789. Today the name is selected by the United States Adopted Name (USAN)
Council, which comprises five individuals—one each from the American Medical
Association, the American Pharmacists Association (formerly the American
Pharmaceutical Association), and the organization publishing the U.S.
Pharmacopeia, as well as one from the FDA and a member-at-large. See USAN
Council, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/about/united-statesadopted-names/usan-council (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
271. § 112(a), 76 Stat. at 790.
272. They argued that the regulation exceed the agency’s statutory authority,
but courts never resolved the issue. A justiciability issue made its way to the
Supreme Court, which found the claim fit for resolution and remanded for the
substantive issues to be considered by the Third Circuit. Abbott Lab’ys v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 156 (1967). The parties settled before oral argument in
the court of appeals. PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS: FOOD AND
DRUG LAW 865 (4th ed. 2014).
273. Ronald M. Levin, The Story of the Abbott Labs Trilogy: The Seeds of the
Ripeness Doctrine, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 430, 440 (Peter L. Strauss ed.,
2006).
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contributed to the development of this framework. First, the statute
now imposed a premarket approval requirement: a company could not
launch until the FDA affirmatively approved its product.274 Second,
the statute now required that products be proven effective as well as
safe.275 And third, Congress directed the FDA to review the
effectiveness of every new drug that had reached the market under a
safety-only NDA in the years before 1962.276 The result was,
eventually, premarket review of ANDAs for purported copies.277
To review the pre-1962 drugs, the FDA launched the Drug
Efficacy Study Implementation (“DESI”) program.278 Relevant here,
it decided to review not only the drugs with safety-only NDAs but also
the drugs that were identical, similar, or related to them, which had
reached the market without applications.279 If the FDA found that a
particular drug with an NDA was effective, then the brand company
would supplement its application, conforming to the new paradigm,
and companies making identical, similar, or related drugs would file
ANDAs, a new mechanism that the FDA created through rulemaking
in 1970.280
The original ANDA was nothing like today’s generic drug
application. The FDA required “brief statements” identifying the
composition of the drug, the place it would be manufactured,
processed, packed, and held, and anyone other than the applicant
involved in the process.281 The applicant certified to compliance with
good manufacturing practices and outlined the methods used in (and
274. §§ 103(a)–(b), 76 Stat. at 782–83.
275. § 102(c), 76 Stat. at 781. In addition, a drug was now a “new drug” unless
it was generally recognized as safe and effective. § 102(a), 76 Stat. at 781.
276. §§ 107(c)(2)–(4), 76 Stat. at 788–89.
277. Applicability of DESI Notices and Notices of Opportunity for Hearing to
Identical, Related, and Similar Drug Products, 37 Fed. Reg. 23185, 23187 (Oct.
31, 1972).
278. See Reports of Information for Drug Effectiveness, 31 Fed. Reg. 9426,
9426 (Jul. 9, 1966).
279. Applicability of DESI Notices and Notices of Opportunity for Hearing to
Identical, Related, and Similar Drug Products, 37 Fed. Reg. at 23187; see also
Abbreviated Applications, 35 Fed. Reg. 6574, 6574 (Apr. 24, 1970). The agency
revoked its earlier opinions that some of these were old drugs. New-Drug Status
Opinions; Statement of Policy, 33 Fed. Reg. 7758, 7758 (May 28, 1968).
280. Applicability of DESI Notices and Notices of Opportunity for Hearing to
Identical, Related, and Similar Drug Products, 37 Fed. Reg. at 23187;
Abbreviated Applications, 35 Fed. Reg at 6574. In 1976, the FDA announced it
would take regulatory action against any generic drug marketed without an
approved application, eliminating the “old drug” pathway for generics. Marketed
New Drugs without Approved New Drug Application, 41 Fed. Reg. 41770, 41770–
71 (Sept. 23, 1976). Many companies marketing duplicates disagreed and argued
that premarket review was not required, but in 1983 the Supreme Court agreed
with the agency. See United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 461
(1983).
281. Abbreviated Applications, 35 Fed. Reg. at 6575.
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the controls used by facilities for) manufacture, processing, and
packing the drug.282 If applicable, the ANDA confirmed that the
proposed product complied with specifications in an official
compendium; otherwise, it confirmed its specifications, and testing
ensured the drug’s identity, strength, quality, and purity.283 If the
notice calling for ANDAs asked for bioavailability data—how much of
the active ingredient (or active moiety) is absorbed from the product
and becomes available at the relevant site in the body, and how
quickly it does so—these would need to be provided as well.284 At
first, though, the science of bioavailability was still rudimentary,285
and the FDA required no information or data comparing the proposed
generic to the brand drug reviewed in the DESI program.
As bioavailability testing matured, it became apparent that
drugs varied significantly in the human body, leading the FDA to take
more aggressive steps to ensure both the bioavailability of drugs and
eventually the bioequivalence of copies.286 In the early 1970s, the
agency proposed to require bioavailability data for new active
ingredients, but otherwise (and for already marketed drugs), it would
call for bioavailability data based on the medical importance of the
drug or indications that bioavailability might be an issue.287 By the

282. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b)(2021) (defining bioavailability as “the
rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety is absorbed from
a drug product and becomes available at the site of drug action”).
283. 21 C.F.R. § 130.4(f)(1)(v) (1973).
284. Id. § 130.4(f)(3); see also id. § 130.4(f)(2) (requiring labeling “in accord
with the labeling conditions described in the finding that an abbreviated newdrug application is sufficient”); id. § 130.4(f)(4) (requiring any other information
available to the applicant on adverse effects); id. § 130.4(f)(5) (allowing the FDA
to ask for additional information); id. § 130.4(f)(7) (requiring a “signature of the
applicant”).
285. Jane Moffitt, The Appropriateness of Bioavailability and Bioequivalence
as Pre-market Clearance Considerations, 34 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 640, 645
(1979) (“At the time of the passage of the Drug Amendments of 1962, and during
the years of the DESI review, it was not possible to study the bioavailability of
drug products with any degree of accuracy.”); Daniel Carpenter & Dominique A.
Tobbell, Bioequivalence: The Regulatory Career of a Pharmaceutical Concept, 85
BULL. HIST. MED. 93, 98 (2011).
286. Tobbell, supra note 197, at 78–79 (discussing “mounting evidence and
growing awareness . . . that not all versions of a pharmaceutical agent produced
the same therapeutic effects”).
287. New Prescription Drugs, 38 Fed. Reg. 885, 886 (proposed Jan. 5, 1973)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130) (noting that “it has now been established that
different formulations of the same drug may produce differing concentrations of
drug in body tissues or fluids when tested under standardized conditions even
though the formulations may meet current standards for in vitro testing” but
“[s]uitable methodology for accurately measuring the bioavailability of a drug in
humans is not currently available for many products,” and thus the FDA would
publish “lists of drugs for which bioavailability data will be required on the basis
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time it finalized this rulemaking in 1977, though, bioavailability
testing methodology had evolved into sophisticated blood plasma
comparisons taken over time.288 The agency decided to require
bioavailability data in all applications and bioequivalence data in
some as well.289
Pharmacist opposition to substitution ebbed. Indeed, some in
organized pharmacy sought enactment of generic substitution
laws.290 The American Pharmaceutical Association had previously
been opposed but now supported generic drug substitution,
explaining that companies now made generic drugs of equivalent
quality to and lower cost than brand drugs.291 Relegated to inferior
professional status by the 1951 prescription standard,292 pharmacists
argued a generic drug exception would play to their strengths; they
stated they understood the new bioequivalence data and could
evaluate equivalence claims, asserting they should have more
authority in the dispensing decision.293 They were trained in
pharmacology, and they could focus on the patient’s health and
counsel the patient about drug use.294 In contrast, the doctors were

of medical importance and/or indications that problems of bioavailability have
been suggested or suspected”).
288. Conditions for Marketing Human Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg.
26,142, 26,149–50 (proposed June 20, 1975) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130).
289. Procedures for Establishing a Bioequivalence Requirement, 42 Fed. Reg.
1,624, 1,634–38 (Jan. 7, 1977) (establishing criteria and procedures for requiring
bioequivalence data relating to pharmaceutical equivalents and alternatives
intended to be used interchangeably for the same therapeutic effect); Procedures
for Determining the In Vivo Bioavailability of Drug Products, 42 Fed. Reg. 1,638,
1,648 (Jan. 7, 1977) (requiring every full or abbreviated application to include
either evidence of in vivo availability or information to permit the FDA to waive
the requirement).
290. For example, “AARP’s Washington offices . . . mobilized grassroots
organizers to work on state and local levels to design and pass drug substitution
laws across the country.” See GREENE, supra note 148, at 147–48.
291. John Jacobs, Drug Anti-Substitution Laws Attacked, WASH. POST (Nov.
16, 1977), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/11/16/druganti-substitution-laws-attacked/e0cc6a94-cc77-45fd-808d-bd8e0858bed1/
(“[U]ntil 1970 the APHA supported [anti-substitution] laws as a protection
against unscrupulous firms . . . . [But] when smaller firms began manufacturing
generic drugs of equivalent quality and lower cost . . . there was no longer any
reason for the anti-substitution laws.”).
292. See Edward G. Feldmann, Drug Product Selection—Freedom with
Responsibility, 12 J. AM. PHARM. ASS’N. 368, 368 (1972) (complaining doctors view
the pharmacist “primarily as a merchant” or “inferior member of the health care
team who usually does what he or she is directed to do”).
293. Tobbell, supra note 197, at 84.
294. SILVERMAN & LEE, supra note 58, at 199–200 (“It seems evident that
dispensing physicians are dissipating much of their limited time in tasks which,
in most cases, can be carried out at least as well—and possibly even better — by
a competent pharmacist . . . .”); see, e.g., George P. Provost, The Pharmacist’s
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slow to support generic substitution. Even in the mid-1970s, the
American Medical Association (“AMA”) still endorsed laws that
“prohibit[ed] the unauthorized substitution of drug products.”295 In
the AMA’s view, these laws “encourage[d] interprofessional
communications regarding drug product selection and assure[d] each
profession the opportunity to exercise fully its expertise in drug usage
to the advantage of patients.”296
C.

Payors Seek Savings

Like pharmacists, payors supported an exception for generic
drugs. Hospitals, which purchase the drugs they administer, had
long since identified the savings available from switching to the copies
that proliferated in the market.297 They developed formularies for
that purpose: lists of medicines stocked in house, from which their
doctors would choose, and the committees that constructed these lists
focused in part on cost.298 An institution’s own formulary bypasses
the substitution issue altogether; the institution employs the doctor
and purchases drugs for its own dispensing pharmacy, and the
formulary limits the doctor’s and pharmacist’s choices at the
outset.299
In the 1960s, however, public and private insurance coverage for
drugs became widespread, increasing interest in the use of
formularies to shift patients to less expensive alternatives to brand

Responsibility in the Choice of Drug Products, 27 AM. J. HOSP. PHARMACY 365, 365
(1970) (arguing for substitution laws on the basis of pharmacist competence).
295. Joint Statement on Antisubstitution Laws and Regulations, 225 JAMA
142, 142 (1973) (discussing a joint statement issued by American Medical
Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Academy of Pediatrics,
and various others).
296. Id.; see also Substitution of Drugs, 212 JAMA 1,369, 1,369 (1970)
(defending prohibitions on substitution, which are “aimed at the unethical
pharmacist,” and pointing out ways a doctor could take steps to “delegate product
selection to a trusted pharmacist” and ways a pharmacist could suggest
alternative products for the doctor to consider); Drug Antisubstitution Laws:
Reprise, 221 JAMA 711, 711 (1972) (arguing substitution could “create a
spectrum of trouble ranging from minor mischief to therapeutic disaster” in part
because the pharmacist rarely knows everything about the patient or why the
physician picked a particular drug).
297. Government institutions (such as the Department of Defense) and public
hospitals (such as Grady Memorial Hospital in Atlanta) reported in the 1960s
that they had cut costs with a switch to these drugs. SILVERMAN & LEE, supra
note 58, at 146 (“There was ample evidence to demonstrate that many
governmental institutions, notably the Department of Defense, were buying
generic drugs at substantial savings.”).
298. See GREENE, supra note 148, at 143–45.
299. See Kathy A. Chase, Medication Management, in INTRODUCTION TO
HOSPITAL AND HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACY PRACTICE 59, 66–67 (2010).
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drugs.300 These were “outpatient” formularies, meant to constrain the
drugs prescribed by doctors and dispensed by pharmacists in the
community.301 As early as the 1950s, state and local public assistance
programs had been constructing formularies for their participating
doctors.302 Employer-based health insurance programs and private
health insurers also covered prescription drugs and developed
formularies to cut their costs.303 But it was the federal government’s
launch of Medicare (for persons over sixty-five) and Medicaid (for
certain vulnerable populations, including those with low income) in
1965 that turned the attention of policymakers to the role that copies
of brand drugs might play in saving expenses.304
By 1967, nearly two-thirds of states covered prescription drugs
as part of their Medicaid programs, and many adopted formularies to
encourage the use of early generic drugs.305 And when Congress
began considering prescription coverage for the Medicare program in
the early 1970s, federal policymakers focused on three perceived
impediments to achievement of savings through generic dispensing.
These three perceived impediments were: the lack of any reliable list
of equivalent generic drugs, the fact that doctors tended to prescribe
by brand name, and state law prohibitions on substitution.306 Even if
the formularies knew which generic drugs could be substituted for
particular brand drugs, state law was an impediment. If a doctor
prescribed a brand product that was not listed on the formulary, the
pharmacist would need to discuss with the doctor whether to dispense
an alternative (unbranded equivalent) covered by the payor.307
Federal focus on these issues started a chain of events that resulted
in the FDA’s creation of a substitution list and the enactment of state
laws carving out a special exception for generic drugs, as explained in
the next Subpart.
300. T. Donald Rucker, The Role of Formularies and Their Relationship to
Drug Product Selection, in GENERIC DRUG LAWS: A DECADE OF TRIAL—A
PRESCRIPTION FOR PROGRESS 465, 469 (Theodore Goldberg et al. eds., 1986)
(discussing “growth of drug insurance plans during the 1960s”). Private insurers,
such as Blue Shield, began offering prepaid drug insurance as part of their plans
in the 1960s. Kathleen Gondek, Prescription Drug Payment Policy: Past, Present,
and Future, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spring 1994, at 1, 4.
301. See Rucker, supra note 300, at 469.
302. See GREENE, supra note 148, at 145 (“Earlier attempts to control the cost
of drug benefits associated with public welfare programs in Baltimore and New
York in the 1950s asked all participating physicians to agree to an outpatient
formulary of drugs for indigent patients.”).
303. See id. at 145–46.
304. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286,
343–44, 351 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1936 et seq.).
305. See GREENE, supra note 148, at 146–47.
306. See generally TOBBELL, supra note 54 (discussing concerns of making
generic drug prescription mandatory for Medicare patients).
307. Chase, supra note 299, at 70.
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FDA Support for Substitution

The FDA had never evinced much interest in pursuing imitation
products simply because of substitution.308 The brand industry’s
concerns about competitive harm did not move the agency. Indeed,
some agency policies jeopardized drug trademarks, but the agency
was implacable even when officials from the Patent and Trademark
Office raised the alarm.309 For decades, the agency’s “apparent
indifference” to the protection of trademarks had concerned brand
companies.310
With the new ANDA provision in place and
improvements in regulatory science, the FDA now took affirmative
steps to support substitution: it prepared and released a list of
substitutable drugs, and with the FTC, it drafted a model substitution
law for states to enact.311
When Congress was considering a prescription drug benefit for
Medicare in the early 1970s, its Office of Technology Assessment
(“OTA”) concluded that an official list of interchangeable products
should be generated to guide selection of the lowest-cost products for
the program.312 The FDA developed a list for use by the Department
of Defense, and in 1977 the head of the FDA’s Office of Generic Drugs
leaked its existence to a leading generic drug policy advocate, who in
turn unveiled it in New York as part of the State’s move towards a
generic substitution law.313 New York planned to adopt this list as
308. See Facchinetti & Dickson, supra note 41, at 470 (noting that the FDA
would act against an imitation product that was subpotent or otherwise
adulterated, but the FDA would not act simply on account of substitution); see
also Dan Ermann & Mike Millman, The Role of the Federal Government in
Generic Drug Substitution, in GENERIC DRUG LAWS: A DECADE OF TRIAL—A
PRESCRIPTION FOR PROGRESS 99, 99 (Theodore Goldberg et al. eds., 1986) (“In
1957, the Commissioner of the FDA stated that the imitation of a brand drug was
not a violation of the FD&C Act if it possessed the proper ingredients in the
strengths indicated on the label.”).
309. The 1938 statute required that a drug not recognized in an official
compendium bear a label with its common or usual name. Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, §502(e), 52 Stat. 1040, 1050–51
(1938). An attorney at PTO reported in 1949 that the FDA “insisted” on treating
a drug’s trademarked name as its “common or usual name.” Derenberg, supra
note 171, at 139 (quoting a letter from the FDA to the House Committee on
Patents that “[o]nce it is established that a certain term has become to consumers
generally the common or usual name for a given . . . drug, the intent of the
[FDCA] is that all persons who manufacture and market such . . . drug identify
it on its label by that name”). The “dangers” of this were readily apparent. Id.
310. Facchinetti & Dickson, supra note 41, at 470; Derenberg, supra note 171,
at 139.
311. See GREENE, supra note 148, at 137–70 (discussing the meticulous
history of substitution and the drafting of model substitution law).
312. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, DRUG BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDY PANEL, DRUG
BIOEQUIVALENCE 57 (1974) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
313. See GREENE, supra note 148, at 154–58 (explaining Marvin Seife leaked
its existence to William Haddad and guided Haddad through a series of Freedom
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its official formulary.314 When the New York Department of Health
and the Governor sought assurance from the FDA that the drugs in
the proposed New York list were indeed therapeutically equivalent,
agency officials validated the state’s list at a meeting with legislative
committee staff.315 On hearing this, Illinois officials asked the agency
to do the same thing.316 The burden of reviewing each state’s list was
significant, and the FDA decided instead to publish its own list.317
Over the same years, the FDA and FTC staff developed a model
drug substitution law for the states.318 The model law permitted a
pharmacist to fill a prescription that specified a particular product by
its brand name with an “equivalent drug product” listed in the state’s
formulary, provided the price was lower.319 That formulary should
list products the FDA had approved as safe and effective and deemed
therapeutically equivalent; it should, in other words, rely on the list
of substitutable products the agency was preparing.320 Relying on the
FDA’s list would eliminate duplication and reduce administrative
costs for the states, the FTC explained, and it would place
responsibility for determining therapeutic equivalence in the hands

of Information Act requests designed to bring its existence to the attention of the
public and force the agency into its release).
314. See Judith Cummings, Albany Finds Choices to Brand-Name Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 29, 1977), https://www.nytimes.com/1977/04/29/archives/albanyfinds-choices-to-brandname-drugs-assembly-panel-will-verify.html.
315. See id.; Transcript of Record at 7–11, Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Whalen, 430
N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1981) (No. 9556) (affidavit of Joseph Ferraro).
316. Therapeutically Equivalent Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 2,932, 2,934 (proposed
Jan. 12, 1979) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 20).
317. Id. (“Based upon these experiences, the agency concluded that continuing
to provide assistance on a State-by-State basis would not be cost effective,
because of the number of requests and the varying definitions and criteria among
the individual statutes for evaluating therapeutic equivalence. Instead, the FDA
decided it should prepare a master list to provide a guidance and information
that could be utilized by each State in meeting its own responsibilities under the
particulars of its drug product selection law.”).
318. The FTC had opened an investigation into whether state pharmacy laws
“unduly” restricted price competition for multisource prescription drugs,
meaning products made by different companies but containing the same active
ingredient. See FTC REPORT, supra note 117, at 1. The FTC had assumed it
would recommend enactment of a federal substitution law preempting state
pharmacy laws, but when it found states were already enacting generic drug
exceptions, it turned to a model law for the remaining states. Michael C.
McCarey, Generic Substitution Policy, 34 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 103, 104 (1979).
319. See FTC REPORT, supra note 117, at 281 (showing Model Product
Selection Act § 5 and its official commentary); see also Kenneth W. Shafermeyer
et al., The FDA Orange Book: Expectations Versus Realities, 1 J. PHARMACY & L.
13, 17 n.28 (1992).
320. See FTC REPORT, supra note 117, at 281–82; see also Shafermeyer et al.,
supra note 319, at 13–14.
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of the agency “that is the single best source of drug information and
scientific expertise.”321
Aligning with payors, pharmacists, and consumer groups, the
Administration pushed for enactment of generic substitution laws.
FDA officials testified before state legislatures in favor of generic
substitution laws, and one brand-company lawyer said this testimony
“effectively neutralized” opposition expressed by doctors,
pharmacists, and the brand companies.322 In 1979, the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare and the chair of the FTC asserted the
model law would save consumers “$400 million a year.”323 President
Carter wrote to state governors that enactment of the model law
“could help save Americans millions of dollars by increasing the use
of generic drug products in place of the higher price brand names.”324
By 1977, over thirty states had enacted generic drug substitution
laws, although they did not all follow the FDA-FTC model.325
The FDA published the first Orange Book on October 31, 1980.326
The preamble made the agency’s goal clear: the list would help states
administer their new generic substitution laws.327
The FDA
emphasized, for state policymakers, the clinical significance of its
determination that two products are equivalent: “FDA believes that
products considered therapeutically equivalent can be substituted
with the full expectation that the substituted product will produce the
same therapeutic effect as the prescribed product.”328 Four years
later, Congress created a statutory pathway for ANDAs proposing
copies of drugs with approved NDAs, which replaced the FDA’s ANDA
321. FTC REPORT, supra note 117, at 284; see also McCarey, supra note 318,
at 106.
322. Nicholas L. Ruggieri, Generic Drug Substitution and the FDA List of
Approved Drug Products, 36 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 556, 559 (1981) (“From the
beginning, the FDA played an active role in support of state generic substitution
legislation, and even supplied witnesses who testified in favor of the proposal.”);
see also Berger, supra note 211, at 23–24 (noting that the FDA supported
enactment of substitution laws).
323. WILLIAM C. CRAY, THE PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION:
THE FIRST 30 YEARS 103 (1989).
324. Id.
325. See FTC REPORT, supra note 117, at 155, 177–80 (presenting a fifty-state
survey current as of 1979); see also Jillena A. Warner, Note, Consumer Protection
and Prescription Drugs: The Generic Drug Substitution Laws, 67 KY. L.J. 384,
395–96, 395 n.43 (1978) (“Between 1972 and 1979 thirty-one states and the
District of Columbia abandoned their antisubstitution laws and enacted various
types of laws permitting substitution.”).
326. Therapeutically Equivalent Drugs; Availability of List, 45 Fed. Reg.
72582, 72582 (Oct. 31, 1980); see generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
APPROVED PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE
EVALUATIONS (1st ed. 1980) [hereinafter 1ST ORANGE BOOK].
327. Therapeutically Equivalent Drugs; Availability of List, 44 Fed. Reg.
2932, 2932 (proposed Jan. 12, 1979) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 20).
328. 1ST ORANGE BOOK, supra note 326, at I-4.
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regulation.329 Today, a generic drug approved under this provision is
usually deemed therapeutically equivalent by the FDA in the Orange
Book and is usually considered substitutable under the state laws
enacted in the 1970s.
IV. RECONSIDERATION OF THE GENERIC DRUG EXCEPTION
The generic drug exceptions are now half a century old, and they
reflect a policymaking initiative that began (at least) sixty years ago
with Senator Kefauver. A great deal has changed since then. The
drug regulatory framework has changed profoundly. The science of
drug development and drug testing is fundamentally different. The
brand and drug industries have evolved. The prescription drug
marketplace is different. It makes sense to reflect on these
exceptions, what they mean for drug trademarks, and whether they
are still important (if they ever were). Doing so requires starting with
a basic drug regulatory point: even if two active ingredients (which
are called “drugs”) are the “same” for regulatory purposes, the
products (which are also called “drugs”) are not the same. The first
Subpart below addresses this confusion, and the following Subparts
take up the fate of trademarks and the generic drug exception.
A.

Different Products and Sources

Scholars and others who write about drug brand names,
including in connection with incremental innovation (and what the
writers call “evergreening” by brand companies), sometimes make
confused—and incorrect—assertions about the differences between
brand drugs and their generic equivalents. For instance, one writer
recently wrote that drug trademarks “confuse” patients into thinking
a trademarked drug and a generic drug are distinct medications.330
But she has it backwards; it is attacks on drug trademarks that
confuse people into thinking a brand drug and a generic drug are the
same when they are not. Reconsidering the exception for generic
drugs requires first unpacking what it does and does not mean to say
that two drugs are the same. Five points are key.
First, although the active ingredients are the same, the products
are not. Both are called “drugs,” which leads to confusion.331 At the
FDA, the term “drug” has more than one meaning. The statute
defines “drug” to mean (among other things) any article “intended for
use” in the treatment of disease, any article (other than food)

329. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585.
330. Hannah Brennan, The Cost of Confusion: The Paradox of Trademarked
Pharmaceuticals, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2015).
331. See Erika Lietzan, The “Evergreening” Metaphor in Intellectual Property
Scholarship, 53 AKRON L. REV. 805, 858–59 (2019) (explaining the different
meanings of “drug” and their relevance to brand drugs and generic equivalents).
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“intended to affect the structure or any function of the body,” and any
“component” of such an article.332 Depending on the statutory or
regulatory provision at issue, the term may refer to an active
ingredient, a finished product, or both.333 Although each “new drug”
requires an approved application,334 the FDA approves drug products,
not active ingredients.335 A drug product is a medicine in the finished
form meant to be sold in the market and administered to patients.336
The active ingredient is the component that furnishes the
pharmacological action of the product: the fluoxetine in Prozac, for
instance, and the atorvastatin in Lipitor.337 When the FDA approves
a NDA, it approves a finished product. The product is a particular
formulation, made as described in the NDA (with the raw materials
specified and sourced from the sellers identified, in the facility
identified, using the manufacturing process described), presented at
a particular strength in a particular dosage form for a particular route
of administration, labeled with particular instructions and, if
requested, a particular brand name.338 The FDA approves the brand
company’s product (based on its full new drug application) and a
generic company’s product (based on its abbreviated application).
Second, although the active ingredients are the “same,” this is a
regulatory concept with a particularized meaning; the active
ingredients may not, in fact, be chemically indistinguishable. The
FDA’s regulations implementing the ANDA provisions state that the
phrase “same as” means, among other things, “identical.”339 But the
332. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
333. Lietzan, supra note 331, at 858.
334. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
335. See Lietzan, supra note 331, at 812–13.
336. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2021) (“Drug product is a finished dosage form, e.g.,
tablet, capsule, or solution, that contains a drug substance, generally, but not
necessarily, in association with one or more other ingredients.”).
337. See 21 C.F.R. § 210.3(b)(7) (2021) (explaining that an “[a]ctive ingredient”
is “any component that is intended to furnish pharmacological activity or other
direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals” and “includes those components that may undergo chemical change in
the manufacture of the drug product and be present in the drug product in a
modified form intended to furnish the specified activity or effect”); see also 21
C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2021) (explaining that “drug substance” is “an active ingredient
that is intended to furnish pharmacological activity or other direct effect in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease or to affect the
structure or any function of the human body” but “does not include intermediates
used in the synthesis of such ingredient”).
338. The company may not use a brand name unless the FDA has approved
the name. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: CONTENTS OF A COMPLETE SUBMISSION FOR THE EVALUATION OF
PROPRIETARY NAMES (2016) (describing the information that is used by the FDA
for the evaluation of proposed proprietary names for drugs).
339. 21 C.F.R. § 314.92(a)(1) (2021).
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agency also rejected the suggestion that it adopt a requirement that
active ingredients “exhibit the same physical and chemical
characteristics, that no additional residues or impurities can result
from the different manufacture or synthesis process; and that the
stereochemistry characteristics and solid state forms of the drug have
not been altered.”340 Instead, the FDA said it would “consider an
active ingredient [in a generic drug product] to be the same as that of
the reference listed drug if it meets the same standards for
identity.”341 Six years later, in Serono Laboratories, Inc. v. Shalala,342
the D.C. Circuit held that the FDA’s decision to interpret “same as”
to permit some variation rather than chemical identity was a
permissible reading of the statute.343
The FDA views the Serono decision as establishing it has broad
discretion to tailor sameness inquiries for generic drugs. For
instance, when the agency approved a generic copy of Lovenox
(enoxaparin sodium), it cited the Serono decision and said that an
ANDA application for enoxaparin could prove active-ingredient
sameness by meeting five criteria, each of which captures a different
aspect of sameness.344 “[W]e have broad discretion,” the agency
wrote, “in determining whether an ANDA applicant has submitted
sufficient information upon which we can reasonably conclude that
340. Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 57 Fed. Reg. 17950, 17958–59 (Apr.
28, 1992).
341. Id. at 17959.
342. 158 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
343. The case involved an ANDA for Repronex (menotropins) that had cited
Serono’s Pergonal (menotropins). Id. at 1316. The active ingredient is a mixture
of follicle stimulating hormone (“FSH”) and luteinizing hormone (“LH”) derived
from the urine of post-menopausal women; the remaining ninety-five percent of
the drug is composed of lactose and uncharacterized urinary proteins. See id.
FSH is a polypeptide hormone consisting of a protein (amino acid) chain and
carbohydrate side chains. See id. at 1317. The amino acid backbone in Repronex
was the same as the backbone in Pergonal, but there were differences in the
carbohydrate side chains sufficient to mean the two products had different
isoforms of FSH. Id. The FDA concluded that the two active ingredients were
the “same” because they had (1) the same protein backbone and amino acid
sequence, (2) the same potency, and (3) the same degree of batch-to-batch
uniformity. See id. at 1320–22. The D.C. Circuit permitted this. See id. The
FDA’s approach to the statutory term (“same” with respect to active ingredient)
rests on the agency’s evaluation of scientific data within its area of expertise. Id.
Its interpretation was a reasonable, and hence permissible, reading of the
statutory term. Id.
344. See Letter from Douglas Throckmorton, Deputy Dir., Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Rsch., Food & Drug Admin., Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., to
Peter O. Safir & Scott L. Cunningham, Covington & Burling 26 (Jul. 23, 2010),
https://www.fda.gov/media/78975/download; see also id. at 10 (stating that the
lack of a definition for “same as” in the statute means Congress recognized the
agency “must have broad discretion with respect to the information” it would
“consider in making a finding on the ‘sameness’ of an active ingredient”).
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the generic drug product’s active ingredient is, as a matter of law, the
‘same’ as that of the RLD.”345 The agency similarly rejected a brand
company’s argument that the generic version of Copaxone (glatiramer
acetate) needed an identical active ingredient.346 Again, it claimed
broad discretion with respect to the sameness requirement.347 Over
the years, the FDA has said that while a different salt of the same
active moiety is considered a different active ingredient,348 different
polymorphs of the same active moiety are considered the same active
ingredient.349 Anhydrous and hydrated entities are also considered
to be the same active ingredient.350 Also, under certain conditions,
differing co-crystals—crystalline materials composed of two or more
different molecules, typically active pharmaceutical ingredient and
co-crystal formers in the same crystal lattice—may be the same active
ingredient.351
Third, the FDA also does not require that the brand and generic
products be identically bioavailable. The statute merely requires
proof of bioequivalence, another regulatory concept. Ordinarily, after
administering the proposed generic drug and the reference drug to a
small group of healthy male and female adults, the generic company
compares the products using two measurements: the maximum
concentration of the active moiety ever achieved in the blood (known
as “Cmax”) and the total amount of active moiety that reaches the blood
(known as “AUC” because it reflects the area under a curve
345. Letter from Douglas Throckmorton, Deputy Dir., Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Rsch., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
to Peter O. Safir & Scott L. Cunningham, Covington & Burling, supra note 344,
at 10.
346. Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch., U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., to Dr. J. Michael Nicholas,
Vice President, Glob. Specialty Meds., Teva Pharms. 1–2 (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://downloads.regulations.gov/FDA-2015-P-1050-0012/attachment_1.pdf.
347. Id. at 7 (“Congress recognized that [the FDA] must have broad discretion
with respect to the information [the agency] may consider in making a finding on
the ‘sameness’ of an active ingredient.”).
348. See 41ST ORANGE BOOK, supra note 12, at xiv–xv; see also U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., MAPP 5018.2, NDA CLASSIFICATION CODES 2-3 (2015),
https://www.fda.gov/media/94381/download.
349. See 41ST ORANGE BOOK, supra note 12, at xiv–xv; see also Abbreviated
New Drug Applications and 505(b)(2) Applications, 81 Fed. Reg. 69,580, 69,597
(Oct. 6, 2016) (explaining that “a polymorph”—“a different crystalline or
amorphous form of the same drug substance”—is considered the “same active
ingredient”); 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (defining active moiety, the underlying molecule
responsible for the pharmacological action of the drug substance).
350. See 41ST ORANGE BOOK, supra note 12, at xiv–xv.
351. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REGULATORY
CLASSIFICATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL CO-CRYSTALS 3 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/
media/81824/download (stating that “a co-crystal with a pharmaceutically
acceptable coformer” is analogous to a polymorph (and thus not a new active
ingredient) if certain conditions are true).
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representing the amount of active moiety bioavailable at points in
time).352 The agency usually requires that the 90% confidence
interval for the ratio between the two products on each measurement
(generic to brand) fall within 80% and 125%.353 Some scientists and
clinicians believe these standards are insufficient for certain types of
drugs, such as drugs with a narrow therapeutic index (meaning a very
small difference between the lowest effective dose and the highest
safe dose) and drugs for treatment of epilepsy.354 Other regulators
have introduced tighter bioequivalence rules for these drugs.355 But
the point is that the brand and generic are not identically
bioavailable. In 2014, for example, after the FDA received nearly two
hundred complaints about insufficient therapeutic effect from
Mallinckrodt’s generic methylphenidate extended-release tablets, the
FDA changed how it wanted generic companies to test the
bioequivalence of these products and ordered the company to confirm
bioequivalence the new way or withdraw its products from the

352. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES WITH PHARMACOKINETIC ENDPOINTS FOR DRUGS
SUBMITTED UNDER AN ANDA DRAFT GUIDANCE (2013) (providing
“recommendations to applicants planning to include bioequivalence (BE)
information in abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) and ANDA
supplements”). Different approaches may be required for modified release
products and for products that raise special issues, such as drugs with especially
long half-lives and orally administered products that act locally rather than
systemically. In some situations, the FDA even waives the requirement for in
vivo bioequivalence studies. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES FOR ORALLY
ADMINISTERED DRUG PRODUCTS—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS DRAFT GUIDANCE 6,
12 (2002).
353. Barbara M. Davit et al., Comparing Generic and Innovator Drugs: A
Review of 12 Years of Bioequivalence Data from the United States Food and Drug
Administration, 43 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 1583, 1585 (2009).
354. See, e.g., Kaja Gantar et al., Meeting Regulatory Requirements for Drugs
with a Narrow Therapeutic Index: Bioequivalence Studies of Generic Once-Daily
Tacrolimus, 12 DRUG HEALTHCARE PATIENT SAFETY 151, 153 (2020) (“Concerns
about bioequivalence are especially pertinent for drugs that have a narrow
therapeutic index (NTI), [i.e.], drugs in which there is only a narrow range of drug
exposure between lack of efficacy and undesirable toxicity. In the case of
tacrolimus, insufficient immunosuppression could lead to acute rejection and
graft failure, whereas excess immunosuppression could result in infection, or
effects related to extensive calcineurin inhibition such as nephrotoxicity or
neurotoxicity.”); Reem Odi et al., Bioequivalence and Switchability of Generic
Antiseizure Medications (ASMs): A Re-appraisal Based on Analysis of Generic
ASM Products Approved in Europe, 62 EPILEPSIA 285, 285–86 (2021) (raising
questions about variability among gabapentin generics).
355. Gantar et al., supra note 354, at 154 (noting that the European Medicines
Agency set the margin as 90.00 to 111.11% for tacrolimus and that Health
Canada set the margin as 90.00 to 112.00%).
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market.356 Something similar happened with generic versions of
GlaxoSmithKline’s Wellbutrin XL (bupropion) in 2012.357
Fourth, other aspects of the products may not be the same.
Federal law does not require the formulations to match, for instance,
so the generic company can usually use different inactive
ingredients.358 A generic company could even use inactive ingredients
that are common allergens and do not appear in the brand product.
The FDA approved a generic propofol, for instance, that contained a
sulfite lacking in the reference drug, Diprivan, and it even rated the
drug therapeutically equivalent—paving the way for automatic
substitution.359 The impurities in the drug substances (active
pharmaceutical ingredients) and drug products generally do not have
to be the same.360 The raw material suppliers will likely be different,
and one company’s supplier could run into quality and purity
problems, while the other’s does not. To give an example, after
Perrigo secured approval of a generic guaifenesin tablet in 2011,
based on Mucinex, it twice had to stop distributing. On the first
occasion, raw material sourcing did not meet specifications (leading
to a two-year wait), and on the second occasion, problems emerged
with an excipient.361 The generic and brand companies make their
products at their own facilities, using their own manufacturing
processes, which differ in at least the details if not in significant ways.
Mylan Pharmaceuticals found itself unable to manufacture 100 mg
phenytoin sodium in capsules that would be bioequivalent to Warner
Lambert’s Dilantin, and famously ended up stuffing a tablet inside a
capsule shell—explaining to a court that it was “unsuccessful in

356. See Methylphenidate Hydrochloride Extended Release Tablets (Generic
Concerta) Made by Mallinckrodt and Kudco, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 27,
2021), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-safety-and-availability/methylphenidatehydrochloride-extended-release-tablets-generic-concerta-made-mallinckrodt
-and-kudco.
357. See Robert Rounder & Saul Perloff, FDA Says Wellbutrin Generic Really
Isn’t Generic After All, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP: THE BRAND PROT. BLOG
(Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.thebrandprotectionblog.com/fda-says-wellbutringeneric-really-isnt-generic-after-all/.
358. 21 C.F.R. § 314.127(a)(8)(i)(A) (2021) (stating that the FDA will not
approve an ANDA if the inactive ingredients are unsafe for use under the
conditions described in the proposed product labeling); id. § 314.127(a)(8)(ii)(A)(3)
(stating that generally, the inactive ingredients in a generic parenteral drug
product must match those of the reference listed brand drug).
359. Zeneca, Inc. v. Shalala, 213 F.3d 161, 166 (4th Cir. 2000).
360. The impurities must be adequately qualified. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ANDAS: IMPURITIES IN DRUG SUBSTANCES
7–8 (2009); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ANDAS:
IMPURITIES IN DRUG PRODUCTS 5–7 (2010).
361. Private Label Mucinex March Reaches Two Formulations, PINK SHEET
(May 4, 2016), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS108317/PrivateLabel-emMucinexem-March-Reaches-Two-Formulations.
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formulating an ordinary capsule that would satisfy FDA and USP
requirements, and only succeeded after it had compressed the
material to the point that it actually comprised a tablet.”362
Finally, each company’s compliance history is unique. For
instance, both the generic company and brand company must be
truthful and accurate in filings to the FDA, but one company may run
into data integrity problems while the other does not. Generic
manufacturer Ranbaxy pleaded guilty to data fraud in 2013, for
example, and active pharmaceutical ingredient maker IPCA
Laboratories engaged in backdating and falsifying laboratory data.363
Innovator Novartis was accused in 2019 of using manipulated data to
support approval of its gene therapy product, ZOLGENSMA.364
Generic companies, like brand companies, may similarly fall out of
compliance with current good manufacturing practices and fail
facility inspections. For example, generic company Apotex received a
series of warning letters arising out of failed inspections in the early
2000s, and the FDA eventually decided to withhold approval of new
ANDAs from the company until the violations were corrected.365 A
senior agency official responsible for drug quality issues told the
generic drug industry at a conference in 2019 that it needed to “take
a strong look” at quality issues; roughly two-thirds of all drugs in
shortage are generic durgs, and manufacturing problems were one
reason.366
In sum, a generic drug and its reference drug are different
products made by different companies. They have the “same active
ingredient” in the regulatory sense, and they are “bioequivalent” in
the regulatory sense. To be sure, if the FDA has found them
therapeutically equivalent, then the agency has concluded that
(barring manufacturing deviations) the generic product “will produce

362. Brief for Appellant at 9, Warner-Lambert Co. v. Shalala, 202 F.3d 326
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 99-5048).
363. Data Integrity Lapses Continue to Bedevil Manufacturers, PINK SHEET
(June 30, 2016), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS000995/DataIntegrity-Lapses-Continue-To-Bedevil-Manufacturers.
364. Derrick Gingery, Novartis’ Zolgensma Had Manipulated Data in
Application,
US
FDA
Says,
PINK
SHEET
(Aug.
6,
2019),
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS140636/Novartis-ZolgensmaHad-Manipulated-Data-In-Application-US-FDA-Says.
365. Apotex Manufacturing Violations Could Delay Launch of Taxotere
Generic, PINK SHEET (Apr. 19, 2010), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.
informa.com/PS052128/Apotex-Manufacturing-Violations-Could-Delay-LaunchOf-Taxotere-Generic.
366. Joanne S. Eglovitch, FDA’s OPQ Chief Tells Generic Drug Makers It’s
Time to Up Their Quality Game, PINK SHEET (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS141152/FDAs-OPQ-Chief-TellsGeneric-Drug-Makers-Its-Time-To-Up-Their-Quality-Game.
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the same clinical effect and safety profile” as the brand product.367
But this is clinical advice and a regulatory concept, cabined by the
limitations of the supporting concepts of “same active ingredient” and
“bioequivalence.”368 And it does not affect the basic point: these are
different products made and sold by different companies.
With this background laid out, the Subparts that follow take up
the generic drug exceptions and the fate of drug trademarks.
B.

The Generic Drug Exception

The generic substitution bills of the 1970s created an exception
for generic drugs from otherwise applicable law that reflects longstanding antisubstitution policy.
First, they operate as express exceptions to the rule that a
pharmacist must dispense the drug (the product) specified by the
prescriber. Substitution of a different drug for the one prescribed
remains a violation of pharmacy law in most of the country, even if
the dispensed drug is accurately labeled (thus, without deception of
the consumer) and less expensive. For example, in Missouri, a
pharmacist may be disciplined for the “[i]ntentional act of
substituting or otherwise changing the content, formula or brand of
any drug prescribed . . . without prior written or oral approval from
the prescriber for the respective change in each prescription.”369
Missouri law adds a proviso to the language just described that a
pharmacist may substitute in accordance with a different provision of
the statute, which in turn allows generic drug substitution if certain
criteria are satisfied.370 To give another example, Kansas pharmacy
law states that every prescription “shall be filled or refilled in strict
conformity with any directions of the prescriber.”371 It adds, “except
that” a pharmacist may engage in generic substitution.372 Dispensing
an FDA-approved, therapeutically-equivalent, generic drug rather
than a branded drug selected by the doctor for the patient would
violate state pharmacy law were it not for the generic drug exception.

367. Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 14,
2017),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/drugsfdaglossary-terms.
368. Id.
369. MO. REV. STAT. § 338.055(16) (2019).
370. Id.
371. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1637(g) (2021); see also ALA. CODE § 34-23-8 (2021);
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 12 § 52.460 (2021); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16 § 1716 (2021);
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 46 § 2747(B)(4)(c)(iii) (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
333.17751(6) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 151.21(1) (2021); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6816(1)(a)
(McKinney 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-15-43(5) (2021); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 47295-30(C)(9) (2020) (repealed 2021); TENN. COMP. R. & Reg. 1140-03-.03(6)(a)
(2021); VA. CODE. ANN. § 54.1-3457(16) (2021); W. VA. CODE R. § 15-2-8.5.1.d
(2021); WIS. ADMIN. CODE PHAR. § 8.05(7) (2021).
372. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1637(g)(1)(C).
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Second, the state generic substitution laws foreclose the brand
company’s use of unfair competition law when the pharmacist
engages in this same substitution. The heart of passing off is
deception of the customer, but a pharmacist who dispenses a generic
drug instead of the requested brand drug does not label the generic
drug as the brand drug.373 Because pharmacy law now permits the
pharmacist to substitute a generic equivalent374 and because, as a
scientific and regulatory matter, the generic company can truthfully
call its product therapeutically equivalent to the brand product,375 the
pharmacist has no need to engage in deception. For similar reasons,
it would be hard to frame the generic company’s actions—making a
copy for substitution purposes and even encouraging substitution—
as unfair competition; state law and federal law and practice work
together to facilitate, and in some cases require, this very
substitution.
Thus, the generic substitution laws amount to an exception from
—and a rejection of—antisubstitution policy. As explained, that
policy had been grounded in both concerns about economic
adulteration (economic fraud on the pharmacy’s part and possible risk
to patients tied to inferior products) and complaints about competitive
harm (to the companies whose products had been specified by brand
name).376
Changes in the drug regulatory framework and
improvements in science have addressed the concerns about inferior
products. Concerns about competitive harm and trademarks, in
contrast, were pushed aside in the name of savings.
The true purpose and actual effect of these laws was to
undermine drug trademarks in order to achieve savings for payors by
instructing that the trademarks be ignored when used in a
prescription after generic drugs have reached the market.377

373. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-23-8(5).
374. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1637(g)(1).
375. See Are Generic Drugs the Same as Brand Name Drugs?, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/answers/publichealth-and-safety/are-generic-drugs-the-same-as-brand-name-drugs/index.html
(“By law, generic drug products must contain the identical amounts of the same
active drug ingredient as the brand name product.”).
376. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
377. In the 1970s, the brand companies challenged the New York substitution
law, arguing that it promoted unfair competition and trademark infringement.
See generally Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Whalen, 430 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1981).
“[W]hether the law provides a technical defense to a trademark or patent
infringement claim is not so important,” their trade association wrote, “as the
fact that the law, by its very terms, penalizes drug products which have wellknown brand names.” Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 21–22, Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n
v. Whalen, 430 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1981) (No. 15831/78). The trial court dismissed
these claims, and the appellate court said the law did not promote unfair
competition or promote infringement because substitution was permissive; “in
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Ordinarily, a trademark is used to distinguish a firm’s goods in the
market and to signal their source.378 With the generic drug
substitution exceptions in place, the brand name no longer functions
this way on the prescription form. State law treats the doctor’s use of
the trademark as an instruction to provide a different company’s
product that contains the same active ingredient and is rated by the
FDA as therapeutically equivalent.379 Although efforts to mandate
“generic” prescribing (by active ingredient) failed, the next best thing
is state legislation that pretends as if the doctors are writing generic
prescriptions, even when they are not doing so.380 No one is hiding
this objective; a leading lawyer for the generic industry argued
recently that “prescription drug brand names cease to function as
trademarks once the same medicine is available from more than [one]
manufacturer.”381
C.

The Assault on Drug Trademarks

At least some of the time, supporters of generic substitution
justify the assault on drug trademarks with the theory that the
trademark improperly perpetuates the innovator’s patent-based
exclusivity in the market.382 The notion seems to be that the patent
creates a “monopoly” that use of the trademark perpetuates.383 The
theory is that the patent allows the manufacturer to build brand
loyalty, which is used after patent expiration to perpetuate monopoly
by luring consumers (here, prescribing doctors) away from lower-

order to comply with the law, a pharmacist is not required to stock or sell an
infringing generic substitute.” Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n, 430 N.E.2d at 1274.
378. See WORLD INTELL. PRO. ORG., INTRODUCTION TO TRADEMARK LAW &
PRACTICE: THE BASIC CONCEPTS 9 (2d ed. 1993).
379. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-23-8(1) (2021).
380. See id. § 34-23-8(5).
381. Alfred B. Engelberg, Have Prescription Drug Brand Names Become
Generic?, AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.ajmc.com/view/
have-prescription-drug-brand-names-become-generic.
382. This argument has been around for decades. In the late 1960s, for
example, Generic Formulae, Inc., argued that Pfizer’s trademark, Terramycin,
named the article covered by the patent, and thus, the “monopoly in the name
expired with the patent.” Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc. v. Generic Formulae, Inc., 275
F. Supp. 421, 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). The court rejected this, saying that the “name,
even if embarrassed by its complete coincidence with all lawful sales of the
patented product, may still identify a specific source to a significant class of users
and be entitled to protection to that extent at least.” Id.
383. E.g., W.J.R. Taylor, The Issue of “Generic” Versus “Trade” Names, 2 INT’L
J. CLIN. PHARMACOLOGY 1, 2 (1969) (“While quality and therapeutic efficacy must
be the physician’s first concern, the cost of medicine being prescribed also must
be considered. Little is accomplished by prescribing the correct medicine if the
patient cannot afford it. This has become a burning social issue. . . . Physicians
should not unwittingly create sales monopolies for certain drug companies by
ordering prescription drugs by ‘trade’ name.”).
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priced substitutes.384 But we do not undermine trademarks in other
product sectors on this basis. Patents and trademarks pertain to
different things, play different roles, and serve different purposes.
A patent protects a specific invention embodied in a particular
drug product, such as its active ingredient, its method of use, or its
method of manufacturing.385 A brand company typically owns a
patent protecting its active ingredient, and the brand product may
embody other discrete inventions also protected by patents.386 In
contrast, the trademark distinguishes the entire product—the
finished dosage form, with a particular amount of the active
ingredient and particular inactive ingredients, in a particular dosage
form, for a particular route of administration, labeled for particular
uses—from others in the market, and it signals the product’s source
(even if it does not identify the source to consumers).387
Just as they pertain to different things, patents and trademarks
also serve different purposes and play different roles. Protection of
patents stimulates scientific and technological progress by ensuring
innovators can enjoy a period of exclusivity in their inventions,
meaning a period during which no others may manufacture and sell
embodiments of their inventions.388 In exchange for describing and
384. But antitrust law does not prohibit monopoly; it only prohibits
monopolization. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an
important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge
monopoly prices—at least for a short period — is what attracts “business acumen”
in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power
will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.”). Monopolization requires unreasonably exclusionary
conduct: willful maintenance of monopoly power in the market, as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident. Thomas A. Lambert & Alden F. Abbott, Recognizing
the Limits of Antitrust: The Roberts Court Versus the Enforcement Agencies, 11 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 791, 794–95 n.14 (2015); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 18 (4th
ed. 2011).
385. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (authorizing issuance of a patent for any “new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,” subject to the other
requirements of the Patent Act).
386. See generally JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW (1st ed.
2005) (discussing different types of drug patent claims).
387. Trademark, Patent, or Copyright, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics/trademark-patent-copyright
(last
visited Oct. 22, 2021) (distinguishing trademark as identification of one’s
“goods . . . [which] distinguishes them from the goods . . . of others, and indicates
the source of [the] goods”).
388. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinning of Patent Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 247, 247, 253 (1994) (explaining the patent system “relies on
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explaining the invention in a public document, the inventor enjoys a
period of exclusivity: no one may make, sell, or offer to sell the
invention until the patent expires.389 A patent on the brand
company’s active ingredient will preclude a generic company from
selling a product with the same active ingredient during the life of the
patent.390 Once the patent expires, however, generic companies may
make, use, and sell products that embody the invention—here, the
active ingredient.391 Society endures the supracompetitive pricing
that patent exclusivity enables for a period, in exchange for details of
the invention and in order to stimulate innovation.
In contrast, the trademark facilitates decision-making based on
the goodwill associated with the source signified by the trademark,
and protection of the trademark prevents appropriation of the
goodwill accumulated and owned by the trademark owner through
investment in its reputation and the quality of its good.392 A
trademark does not expire so long as it remains in use and under the
control of the trademark owner. But it never prevents approval or
sale of competing drugs, including generic drugs with the same active
ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, and strength. It
simply signals to the market the source of one particular product (or
products) containing that active ingredient, and even after patent
expiration and generic drug entry, it can continue to do so.393
property concepts” and “prevents others from reaping where they have not sown
and thereby promotes [research and development] investment in innovation”).
389. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (delineating a patent holder’s rights to raise
infringement claims). In exchange for revealing information that society can use
forever (a dynamic gain), there is a welfare loss associated with monopoly power
(a static cost). See generally Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent
Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990).
390. This is because a generic drug must have the same active ingredient as
its reference drug. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(ii); see also Lietzan & Acri
née Lybecker, supra note 24, at 1330–31 (discussing importance of active
ingredient patent). The FDA may not approve a generic application if the product
would infringe the brand company’s patent. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii) (saying
that if the generic applicant states it will wait for patent expiry to launch its
product, the FDA may not issue final approval of the generic drug until patent
expiry); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A) (saying that if the generic instead challenged the
patent, resulting in litigation that the generic then lost, the court must order the
effective date of FDA approval to be no earlier than patent expiry).
391. See John A. Pearce II, How Companies Can Preserve Market Dominance
After Patents Expire, 39 LONG RANGE PLAN. J. 71, 71 (2006) (“When a patent
expires, however, lower-priced versions of the item can be introduced by rivals.”).
392. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of
Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 549 (2006).
393. Cf. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (noting
an earlier case had “decided no more than that the existence of a patent during
the period when the goods became known to the public might be a controlling
element in determining whether the name under which they were sold indicated
a single source of origin” but adding that “since then courts have several times
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This is, in fact, the reason to protect drug trademarks. The twin
doctrinal bases for trademark protection are germane here.394 Those
who attack drug brand names because “the drug is the same” in a
sense prove why we need to protect brand names. The products are
not the same, the sources are not the same, and market participants
may want to select products based on their source and the seller’s
reputation for product quality. Not only does the trademark
distinguish the brand company’s product from generic versions made
by other companies,395 but it distinguishes the brand company’s
product from other brand products in the same therapeutic class:
Prozac (which contains fluoxetine) from Paxil (paroxetine), for
instance. It does not distinguish “fluoxetine” (the active ingredient of
Prozac) from Paxil (let alone the active ingredient of Paxil and generic
versions of Paxil).396 And when a brand company uses the trademark
on related products, the mark both distinguishes the products from
those of other companies and signals the relationship among the
products.
Otsuka markets six distinct products containing
aripiprazole: one called the Abilify MyCite Kit (a tablet embedded
with a sensor intended to track ingestion), one called the Abilify
Maintena (a suspension for oral release), and four called Abilify (an
oral tablet, an oral solution, an orally disintegrating tablet, and an
intramuscular injection).397 This is similar to Honda’s use of the
“Acura” trademark on a variety of related luxury car models: the ILX,
TLX, RLX, MDX, and NSX.398 Affixing a known mark to a product
conveys useful information, allowing the purchaser to select based on
familiarity with the manufacturer and the quality of the other
products bearing the same brand name.
Some will argue that brand loyalty is not rational marketplace
behavior in this context.399 The argument may be that the products
are close enough and will act the same way in the body, so putting
aside relatively unlikely manufacturing and quality problems,
neither the doctor nor the patient will notice or care about the
said that the name of goods protected by patent might in fact indicate not only
the kind of goods they were, but as well that they emanated from a single
source”).
394. See supra Subpart 0.
395. See Trademark, Patent, or Copyright, supra note 387.
396. See Gerardo Sison, Paxil vs. Prozac: Differences, Similarities, and Which
Is Better for You, SINGLECARE (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.singlecare.com/blog/
paxil-vs-prozac/.
397. Our Products, OTSUKA, https://www.otsuka-us.com/products (last visited
Oct. 22, 2021).
398. ACURA, https://www.acura.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
399. E.g., James T. Doluisio, A Definition of Bioequivalence/Bioavailability
and a Historical Perspective, 32 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 506, 508 (1977) (arguing
that the intent of a generic substitution law is “not to alter the physician’s right
to specify the drug to be used for the patient but it is intended to alter his ability
to select a specific manufacturer of that drug”).
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difference in source. And if they do not mind or even notice, this
argument might be: why does trademark law even care? It cares
because the trademark—or at least the underlying goodwill—is
property.400 It cares because trademarks are not patents, and keeping
the concepts separate protects the coherence of both doctrines.401 It
cares because sometimes there are differences between the products,
including quality differences, and differences among the sources
(such as compliance and reputational differences).402 It cares because
the trademark continues to matter to its owner and function in the
market as a source indicator.403
All the responses point to trademark protection’s dynamic
goals.404 But what about the fact that we may have a profound
interest in dispensing less expensive generic drugs rather than the
brand drugs to which they are equivalent—a static objective? The
answer may lie in reviewing how the market works today.405

400. See generally Adam Mossoff, Trademark as a Property Right, 107 KY. L.J.
1 (2018) (discussing relationship among trademark, goodwill, and property right).
401. See id. at 16 (differentiating trademarks from patents by not conferring
exclusive titles to trademark owners); see also Trademark, Patent, or Copyright,
supra note 387 (discussing the differences between trademarks and patents and
the different benefits one may gain from their protection).
402. See Trademark, Patent, or Copyright, supra note 387.
403. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
404. For a similar reason, courts did not accept the argument that mimicking
trade dress in order to encourage substitution was justified because substitution
would save consumers money. In 1980, for instance, Premo argued to the Third
Circuit that federal policy favored competition, and it argued that the state
policies underlying generic drug substitution laws “demand[ed] the conclusion
that generic drug manufacturers should be free to copy the form and appearance”
of popular branded products. SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Lab’ys., Inc., 625 F.2d
1055, 1067 (3d Cir. 1980). In essence, the company contended “that it would be
somehow in the public interest to permit it . . . to facilitate passing off.” Id. The
court rejected this argument, focusing on the tradeoff between static and dynamic
social welfare: “certain kinds of business activity, while promoting competition in
the short run, are in the long run apt to be destructive of competition.” Id.
Allowing “substitutions of products over which the first manufacturer has no
quality control in the long run can only discourage the effort to compete on the
basis of reputation for quality.” Id. A district court in New Jersey rejected the
same argument, noting that the defendants were “trying to drape themselves in
the mantle of free competition,” which was “disingenuous” because their “decision
to simulate plaintiffs’ trade dress yields society no benefits.” Boehringer
Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Lab’ys, 532 F. Supp. 1040, 1066 (D.N.J.
1980).
405. In an earlier paper, the Author explored the fact that generic drugs are
substituted for medical uses that remain under patent owned by the brand
company, leading to infringement. In searching for a solution to this problem,
the Author assumed the need to preserve automatic substitution in noninfringing situations. On further reflection, the Author prefers to say that we
have an interest in the dispensing of generic equivalents when appropriate—
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Ask the Question Again: A Better Path to Generic Dispensing

Senator Kefauver wrote in 1966 that “the man who orders does
not pay, and the man who pays does not order.”406 And of course,
neither consumes the product. At the end of the 1970s, when the state
law exceptions were locked in place, an FTC official repeated this,
saying there was inadequate competition in the drug marketplace
because “the consumer who pays does not choose, and the physician
who chooses does not pay.”407 The notion is that the party choosing
the medicine (the doctor) does not internalize the cost of the medicine
and thus, when selecting among treatments in the marketplace, has
no reason to consider relative cost.408 This could, in theory, give brand
loyalty undue prominence in the doctor’s decision-making, disrupting
forces that would ordinarily shift consumption to a less expensive
alternative.409 Even when payors adopted reimbursement strategies
to give pharmacists an incentive to dispense the lowest cost drug
possible, state laws prohibiting substitution tied the pharmacists’
hands.410 Hence the need for a generic drug exception.
Nearly sixty years have passed since Senator Kefauver made his
remark, however, and more than forty years have passed since the
states enacted exceptions for early generic drugs. Much has
rather than in their automatic substitution. See Erika Lietzan, Paper Promises
for Drug Innovation, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 168, 195–96 (2018).
406. ESTES KEFAUVER, IN A FEW HANDS: MONOPOLY POWER IN AMERICA 8
(1965).
407. McCarey, supra note 318, at 103.
408. Steve D. Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 10–11 (2009) (“Not having the
obligation to pay, doctors are relatively price-insensitive, i.e., they select which
drugs to prescribe based on factors other than price.”); id. at 11 n.33 (collecting
various articles from 1993 to 2007 discussing the price insensitivity of doctors).
409. See, e.g., id., at 16 (arguing doctors are “price insensitive and conditioned
by years of brand promotion” so “continue to write prescriptions for the brand
product,” but “[w]hen a generic is automatically substitutable at the pharmacy
counter, the price/quality decision is back in the hands of economic decision
makers who take account of prices: the pharmacist who makes greater margins
on generics suggests them to consumers, and consumers can choose the lowerpriced generic or decide that the value of the brand justifies a higher price or
higher insurance co-payment”); see also James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition
and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 437 n.7 (1986) (“Because of the
enactment of antisubstitution legislation, brand-name manufacturers could
insulate their market share by creating brand-name recall in physicians and
pharmacists, who would tend to prescribe and dispense brand-name drug
products.”).
410. McCarey, supra note 318, at 103 (“[W]hile the wholesale price
differentials between generic and brand-name drug products provides an
incentive to substitute, most pharmacists are either prohibited from substituting
by state anti-substitution laws or discouraged from doing so by burdensome state
product selection laws.”).
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happened since. When Senator Kefauver wrote, there were no
ANDAs and no bioequivalence findings—let alone therapeutic
equivalence determinations by the FDA. Soon enough, the FDA
created the ANDA and therapeutic equivalence determinations, and
later Congress created a statutory generic drug approval framework
requiring proof of bioequivalence. The FDA has developed deep
expertise in generic drug equivalence, and it has issued nearly two
thousand guidance documents with particularized bioequivalence
testing instructions sorted by active ingredient.411 The generic
industry has become enormous, profitable, and powerful, with an
influential trade association that did not even exist in the 1970s.412
Patients today are also much more likely to be involved in decisions
about treatment, including selection of drugs.413 Modern patients
have access to more information, in part due to the information
technology explosion and the revolution in our understanding of
human disease and therapeutic options.414 Further, a series of free
speech rulings affirmed the right of consumers to receive information,
including information about medical treatments,415 and in the 1980s,

411. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: BIOEQUIVALENCE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIFIC PRODUCTS (2010)
(discussing the FDA’s process on designing bioequivalence studies and making
FDA bioequivalence studies available to public); Product-Specific Guidances for
Generic Drug Development, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/scripts/cder/psg/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 22, 2021) (listing 1,921
currently published product-specific guidances).
412. See Erika Lietzan, The History and Political Economy of the HatchWaxman Amendments, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 53, 83 (2018) (discussing
emergence of the modern generic company trade association in the early 1980s);
Carpenter & Tobbell, supra note 285, at 122 (noting that the generic industry
was not part of the political landscape in the 1970s and that their trade
association at the time lacked power).
413. See Tobbell, supra note 197, at 83–84 (arguing that multiple factors led
the public questioning procedures of treatment decision-making); see generally
Lewis A. Grossman, FDA and the Rise of the Empowered Consumer, 66 ADMIN. L.
REV. 627 (2014) (discussing modern consumers’ involvement in the regulation of
food and drugs).
414. See Erika Lietzan & Isabelle Moine-Dupuis, Early Access to Unapproved
Medicines in the United States and France, 19 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
1, 14–15 (2020) (“[A] patient today has access to more personal health
information than a patient fifty years ago, as well as more information about
diseases and potential medical interventions.”).
415. E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (holding that protection of speech is afforded “to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both”); Wash. Legal Found. v.
Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that the FDA’s
restrictions on use of textbooks and journal reprints to promote unapproved uses
of approved drugs violated the First Amendment), vacated in part sub nom.
Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (vacating on
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the FDA permitted direct-to-consumer advertising about the uses of
prescription drugs.416
So much has changed that we might not see market failure if the
generic drug exceptions were removed from state law. Even if the
initial assault on drug trademarks in the 1960s and 1970s—the
subordination of trademark law’s dynamic goals for the static goal of
cost savings for payors—could be normatively justified, the normative
basis collapses if automatic substitution is no longer needed to ensure
the least expensive drugs are dispensed when medically appropriate.
Consider, then, a hypothetical world: today’s modern world,
without generic substitution laws. In this world, substitution of
drugs—dispensing a product other than the product ordered—would
always violate pharmacy law. Taking steps to induce passing off,
which includes deception of the customer, would remain unfair
competition. Cases asserting as much remain successful today.417
mootness grounds because government changed its interpretation of the
statutory provisions).
416. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 50 Fed. Reg.
36,677, 36,677 (Sept. 9, 1985).
417. E.g., Par Pharm., Inc. v. Searle Pharms., Inc., No. 85C2027, 1985 WL
2353, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1985) (finding it “actionable . . . under New Jersey
law for a drug manufacturer to put a product in the hands of a pharmacist in a
form in which the manufacturer can reasonably anticipate that it may be passed
off as another product even if the manufacturer does nothing else to encourage
passing off” (quoting Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 747 F.2d 844, 852 (3d
Cir. 1984))); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Chelsea Lab’ys, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 278,
281 (D.N.J. 1982) (“Courses of conduct that make it possible or feasible for a
manufacturer or pharmacist to fill a prescription with a medication other than
that which the doctor ordered, and to give as little indication as possible that a
substitution was made (as by copying trade dress) cannot stand very high on the
scale of values. It ranks with selling imitations on the silent pretense that they
are genuine. Such courses of conduct ease the passing off of goods.”); Hoffman
La Roche, Inc. v. Premo Pharm. Lab’ys, Inc., No. 77-1001, 1980 WL 30221, at *13,
*15 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 1980) (suggesting that a company copying the trade dress of
another cannot say it is unaware of the possibility that retailers may engage in
“passing off” its goods as those of another—particularly when its goal is to have
its product provided as a “generic substitute” for the copied goods of others and
when it is made aware that pharmacists were, in fact, mislabeling the vial or
passing the drug off in some other way); Biocraft Lab’ys, Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc.,
532 F. Supp. 1068, 1074, 1082–83 (D.N.J. 1980) (finding that Biocraft
deliberately copied Merck’s trade dress for Elavil (amitriptyline) with its generic
version, found bioequivalent by the FDA, and approved via the regulatory ANDA
paradigm, and in light of evidence of “palming off,” granting summary judgment
declaring that Biocraft’s copying of the trade dress was unfair competition);
Pennwalt Corp. v. Zenith Lab’ys., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 413, 418 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(“The exact issue before this court is whether Zenith can be held responsible for
a pharmacist’s palming off of Phentermine Hydrochloride for Ionamin. This court
is in agreement with the Eighth Circuit, Seventh Circuit and the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts that the answer is yes, and that
this result is in conformity with the generalized Michigan law on unfair
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Claiming equivalence to induce substitution when the FDA has not
found equivalence would be unfair competition or false advertising.418
competition. Anyone who puts goods into the hands of dealers for sale to the
public, which contain the means for deceiving purchasers, and which that person
can reasonably anticipate may be so used, is subject to injunction against the
further providing of these means, to eliminate unfair competition against the
goods of another which has been or is likely to be engaged in by the dealers.”);
Merrell-National Lab’ys., Inc. v. Zenith Lab’ys., Inc., No. 76-2440, 1977 WL
22787, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 1977) (“[I]t is this Court’s reasoned opinion that the
record available to the Court at this time sufficiently indicates that the liability
for passing off extends not only to the defendant pharmacies, but also to
defendants Zenith and Paramount, i.e., it is very likely that the plaintiff will
prevail on the merits regarding its unfair competition claim against all
defendants.”).
418. These rare cases involve prescription drugs without approved
applications and therapeutic equivalence assessments. The reason this happens
is not important here. See Erika Lietzan, Access Before Evidence and the Price of
the FDA’s New Drug Authorities, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1243, 1272–75 (2019)
(explaining the history of unapproved prescription drugs). But most courts
permit false advertising cases to proceed. E.g., G&W Lab’ys, Inc. v. Laser
Pharms., LLC, No. 3:17-cv-3974-BRM-DEA, 2018 WL 3031943, at *13, *20
(D.N.J. June 19, 2018) (permitting Lanham Act claim, state law statutory unfair
competition claim, and state unfair competition common law claim based on false
claims of equivalence); Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. River’s Edge Pharms., LLC, No.
AW-09-02601, 2010 WL 3087419, at *3, *5 (D. Md. Aug. 6, 2010) (denying motion
to dismiss Lanham Act claim of false or misleading advertising of the unapproved
prescription drug “RE Methylphen,” which the defendant allegedly claimed had
the same amount of the same active ingredient as plaintiff’s Prosed, causing
private drug data publishing services to list it as a generic for Prosed); Sciele
Pharma, Inc. v. Brookstone Pharms., LLC, No. 1:09-CV-3283-JEC, 2010 WL
9098290, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss Lanham
Act false advertising claim relating to claim that defendant’s PNV and PNV-DHA
prescription prenatal vitamins contain the same amount of the same ingredients
as plaintiff’s Prenatal Elite and Prenate DHA, causing drug databases to link
them and pharmacists to improperly substitute the one for the other);
HealthPoint, Ltd. v. Allen Pharm., LLC, No. SA-07-CA-0526-XR, 2008 WL
728333, at *1, *16 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss Lanham
Act false advertising and unfair competition claims grounded in defendant’s
promotion of its unapproved drug, AllanDerm, as a “generic equivalent to and
substitute for” plaintiff’s unapproved drug XenaDerm); Pedinol Pharmacal, Inc.
v. Rising Pharms., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 137, 140–41 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims of false
advertising and unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act, in turn,
grounded in defendant’s allegedly false comparisons of its lactic acid product for
plaintiff’s Lactinol); Axcan Scandipharm Inc. v. Ethex Corp., 585 F. Supp. 2d
1067, 1082–83 (D. Minn. 2007) (denying defendant’s motion for summary
judgment in a false advertising and unfair competition case involving several
defendants who promoted their pancreatic enzyme drugs as having an “identical
formulation” to the plaintiff’s pancreatic enzyme product, thus allegedly implying
their drugs were its “generic equivalent substitute[s]”); Pediamed Pharms., Inc.
v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 715, 729, 731 (D. Md. 2006)
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But a generic company could truthfully and accurately claim that
its product was an approved generic of—and therapeutically
equivalent to—a particular branded product, identified by its
trademark. This would not violate FDA law, nor would it constitute
trademark infringement.419 These claims were impossible in the
1960s and 1970s because the modern generic drug approval
framework and Orange Book did not yet exist.420
Generic companies could brand their products; some already
do.421 They could promote their products directly to payors, pointing
to the therapeutic equivalence and lower price, as they currently
do.422 They could promote their products as a class to prescribers:

(denying summary judgment for both parties in Lanham Act unfair competition
suit brought by manufacturer of Viravan-S against manufacturer of V-Tann,
which it advertised by saying “compare the active ingredient” of Viravan-S);
Healthpoint, Ltd. v. River’s Edge Pharms., LLC, No. SA-03-CV-984-RF, 2005 WL
356839, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2005) (finding plaintiff adequately stated
Lanham Act false advertising and unfair competition claims in connection with
the defendant’s failure to distinguish its product from plaintiff’s—in marketing
to wholesalers, distributors, pharmacies, and managed care organizations—on
any basis other than price, thus leading to widespread substitution); Schwarz
Pharma, Inc. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 967, 978, 980–81
(E.D. Wis. 2005) (denying summary judgment in a similar action involving a
defendant that marketed Neosol, which it described as containing the same
amount of the same active ingredient as its “reference” product, plaintiff’s Nulev);
Solvay Pharms., Inc. v. Global Pharms., 298 F. Supp. 2d 880, 886 (D. Minn. 2004)
(denying motion to dismiss a company’s false advertising claim in connection with
a defendant’s alleged advertising of its own pancreatic enzyme product as a
“substitute” for plaintiff’s); Solvay Pharms., Inc. v. Global Pharms., 419 F. Supp.
2d 1133, 1144–45 (D. Minn. 2006) (denying motions for summary judgment
regarding plaintiff’s false advertising claim in connection with defendant’s
alleged advertising of its pancreatic enzyme product as “equivalent,”
“comparable,” and “generic” versions of plaintiff’s pancreatic enzyme product).
419. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 153, § 23:11 (stating that “use of another’s
trademark to identify the trademark owner’s goods” is “not an infringement” of
trademark); see also Generic Drugs: Questions & Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/questions-answers/genericdrugs-questions-answers.
420. Orange Book Preface: Preface to the 41st Edition, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approvalprocess-drugs/orange-book-preface (stating that the Orange Book was first
“distributed as a proposal in January 1979”).
421. See, e.g., Why Branded Generics Matter, ABBOTT (June 27, 2017),
https://www.abbott.com/corpnewsroom/strategy-and-strength/why-brandedgeneric-matter.html.
422. See, e.g., Sandoz Launches Ask for Generics Campaign in US, to Raise
Awareness of Importance of Sustainable Access to Generic Medicines, SANDOZ
(Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.us.sandoz.com/news/media-releases/sandozlaunches-ask-generics-campaign-us-raise-awareness-importance-sustainable.
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“prescribe generic sildenafil!” or even “prescribe generic!”423 The cost
of communicating with prescribers has plummeted since the 1960s
and 1970s; a company can now reach prescribers in seconds using
modern technology.424 Generic companies could also promote their
products—individually or in classes—directly to patients. (For
example: “Generic versions of Viagra are now FDA-approved and
available at pharmacies! Ask your doctor to prescribe a low-cost
equivalent!”)
Doctors may find it easier to write generic prescriptions now
because electronic health record systems can eliminate the need to
remember active ingredient names, which can be complex and even
confusingly similar to the names of related active ingredients.425
Federal legislation in 2009 authorized the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to provide incentive payments for the
adoption and meaningful use of certified electronic health record
technology.426 The ideal electronic health record platform exchanges

423. See, e.g., Ameet Sarpatwari et al., Paying Physicians to Prescribe Generic
Drugs and Follow-On Biologics in the United States, PLOS MED. (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001802
#sec007 (considering various physician-centered strategies to promote generic
drug prescribing).
424. See Elaine K. Howley, Do Drug Company Payments to Doctors Influence
Which Drugs They Prescribe?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 31, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://health.usnews.com/health-care/patient-advice/articles/2018-08-31/dodrug-company-payments-to-doctors-influence-which-drugs-they-prescribe.
425. This Article uses “electronic health record” (“EHR") to mean a
computerized medical information system that collects, stores, and displays
patient information and that is capable of exchanging information with other,
interoperable, computerized medical systems elsewhere in the health
information technology infrastructure. Within the literature, some would use
“electronic medical record” (“EMR”) for such a system, while others would reserve
EMR for the electronic version of an old-fashioned paper record within a doctor’s
office and EHR for the record meant for sharing with other health organizations.
On terminology, see Albert Boonstra & Manda Broekhuis, Barriers to the
Acceptance of Electronic Medical Records by Physicians from Systemic Review to
Taxonomy and Interventions, BMC HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. (Aug. 6, 2010),
https://bmchealthservres.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-6963-10-231;
Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. & Joanne Callahan, Understanding Medical Records in the
Twenty-First Century, 22 BARRY L. REV. 273, 278–85 (2017) (describing the
components of an EMR). For histories of EMRs, see Nicolas P. Terry, Meaningful
Adoption: What We Know or Think We Know About the Financing, Effectiveness,
Quality, and Safety of Electronic Medical Records, 34 J. LEGAL MED. 7, 9–14
(2013); John Jay Kenagy, Regulating Electronic Health Records Through the
“Nuclear” Threat and Other Enforcement Options: Federal Government Actions to
Compel EHR Industry Changes, HEALTH LAW., Feb. 2021, at 5, 6–8.
426. See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 467 (2009); see also Promoting Interoperability
Programs, CTRS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/
regulations-and-guidance/legislation/ehrincentiveprograms?redirect=/herincenti
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information with other provider’s health information technology
systems as needed.427 Healthcare providers who have adopted these
systems send electronic prescriptions to dispensing pharmacies.428
Today, when a prescriber types a brand name (such as “Zocor”) into a
provider’s electronic prescribing system, the program may offer the
option to write, instead, a prescription for simvastatin.429 In a world
without generic drug substitution laws, electronic prescribing
interfaces could default to a generic prescription, nudge the
prescriber towards a generic prescription, or simply offer the
prescriber a choice.
Payors will play the most important role. Since the 1960s and
1970s, payors have developed increasingly sophisticated strategies to
steer doctors and patients to generic drugs.430 For instance, a payor’s
formulary committee may simply decline to cover the brand drug,
excluding the product from coverage and listing only the generic
drugs.431 Or it may adopt a tiered formulary to drive patients to
generic copies. In a tiered formulary, preferred medications (generic
equivalents) are placed in a tier that involves lower costs for the
patient, while a nonpreferred medication (the brand product) is
placed in a higher-cost tier.432 In this case, patients sensitive to
copayment differences could ask their doctors to prescribe generic
veprograms (Sept. 16, 2021, 11:45 AM); Get the Facts About Electronic Health
Records: Advancing America’s Health Care, OFF. OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR
HEALTH INFO. TECH., https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/fact-sheets/
ehrs-advancing-americas-health-care.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
427. Terry, supra note 425, at 27 (“EHRs should be able to exchange
information with other EHRs (for example, other providers’ systems), share data
with patients and external stakeholders such as public health authorities, and
share information across an institution’s HIT ecosystem (such as with eprescribing, CPOE, or clinical decision support (CDS) modules).”).
428. What is Electronic Prescribing?, OFF. OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR
HEALTH INFO. TECH. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.healthit.gov/faq/whatelectronic-prescribing.
429. See, e.g., Cholesterol-Lowering Drug, CLEVELAND CLINIC (July 28, 2020),
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/drugs/8744-cholesterol-lowering-drugs
(listing simvastatin as generic name for Zocor side by side).
430. See Erika Lietzan, The Uncharted Waters of Competition and Innovation
in Biological Medicines, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 883, 907–09 (2017) (explaining the
power of payors to select medicines); see also Joanna Shepherd, Deterring
Innovation: New York v. Actavis and the Duty to Subsidize Competitors’ Market
Entry, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 663, 688–92 (2016) (explaining the power of
payors to select medicines).
431. See, e.g., Alison Kodjak, Will Your Prescription Meds Be Covered Next
Year? Better Check!, NPR (Aug. 15, 2016, 4:32 AM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2016/08/15/489790412/will-your-prescription-meds-becovered-next-year-better-check.
432. Cole Werble, Formularies, HEALTHAFFAIRS 11 (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171409.000177/listitem/hpb_201
7_09_14_formularies.pdf.
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drugs. The payor’s formulary committee might impose a “prior
authorization” requirement so that the patient must obtain
permission before the brand product will be covered.433 Already
today, some research suggests payor practices are more important
than generic drug substitution laws in keeping healthcare
expenditures down.434 Without the laws, payor practices would
presumably play the primary role.
The primary cost of eliminating the generic substitution laws
would be the added burden for pharmacists and doctors. If a doctor
still selects a branded product and the pharmacist discovers the payor
will not cover the brand drug (or has implemented provisions that
favor the generic drug), the doctor and pharmacist will need to
communicate about whether an alternative covered drug is suitable.
Payors and others motivated to shift patients to generic drugs—
including the generic industry—could reduce this burden by
promoting the availability of particular generic equivalents and
encouraging doctors to engage in generic prescribing outright.
Shifting the burden to payors and generic companies makes some
sense because they stand to benefit; they have an incentive to invest
in the process and steer doctors and patients to generic drugs.
In this hypothetical world, after approval of a generic equivalent,
a prescription specifying the brand product would reflect a doctor’s
deliberate choice. This choice, in turn, would reflect the doctor’s
familiarity with the brand company and its products; it would reflect
brand loyalty and the goodwill the brand company has built up. This
is how a trademark is supposed to function.435 Conversely, a
prescription specifying the active ingredient would also align with the
purpose of trademark law. By specifying the active ingredient instead
of a particular company’s approved product, the doctor signals
indifference as to source, which trademark law permits.436 Here, the
brand company has accrued insufficient goodwill to maintain sales
once less expensive equivalents—or less expensive drugs with the
same active ingredient—are available.

433. See Prior Authorization, ACAD. OF MANAGED CARE PHARMACY (July 18,
2019),
https://www.amcp.org/about/managed-care-pharmacy-101/conceptsmanaged-care-pharmacy/prior-authorization.
434. See generally Dana P. Goldman et al., Prescription Drug Cost Sharing:
Associations with Medication and Medical Utilization and Spending and Health,
298 JAMA 61 (2007) (describing research that suggests strategies adopted by
health plans and other payors to steer doctors and patients to lower-priced drugs
have reduced the role of state substitution laws in keeping expenditures down).
435. See Margaret Chon, Trademark Goodwill as a Public Good: Brands and
Innovations in Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 277,
291–92 (2017).
436. See Alexandra J. Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 1977, 1992 (2019).

W03_LIETZAN

2021]

(DO NOT DELETE)

1/10/22 8:32 PM

IGNORING DRUG TRADEMARKS

1019

CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the generic drug substitution laws of the
1970s sacrificed the procompetitive and dynamic goals of trademark
law, based on a theory of market failure that may not be accurate
anymore, for short-term cost savings that could now be accomplished
if generic companies assumed some responsibility for promoting their
own products and pharmacists and physicians accepted the burden of
engaging in conversations, when needed, about what lies in the best
interest of particular patients. Under the circumstances, repeal of
the generic drug exceptions makes sense, and market participants
should focus on ways to encourage use of generic drugs without
undermining marks.437 A senior brand-industry lawyer, upon
hearing the topic and thesis of this Article, commented that generic
drug substitution is “water under the bridge.” That is a fair criticism;
repeal of the generic drug exception is unlikely as a political
matter.438 Moreover, it is possible generic drug substitution is
diminishing in practical importance; perhaps doctors are already
switching to prescribing by active ingredient, and perhaps payors are
already forcing them to do so.
But the Article relates to two live and important issues. First, it
responds in part to continued attacks on drug trademarks in the
literature, such as a recent proposal that generic drug manufacturers
be allowed to adopt the brand name of the reference drugs on which
their drugs are based.439 This is nothing new; there were similar
arguments in the 1970s, including the proposal that the FTC seek
cancellation of drug trademarks at patent expiration on the ground
the names had become generic.440 So long as these arguments appeal
to other scholars and receive attention from policymakers, a response
grounded in the role of trademarks and the essential difference
between drug patents and drug trademarks remains important.
Second, it points to another area of scholarship and policy writing in
which sloppiness about the distinction between drugs, on the one

437. See Niteesh K. Choudhry et al., Improving Adherence to Therapy and
Clinical Outcomes While Containing Costs: Opportunities from the Greater Use of
Generic Medications: Best Practice Advice from the Clinical Guidelines Committee
of the American College of Physicians, 164 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 41, 46–47
(2016).
438. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, GENERIC DRUG SUBSTITUTION
LAWS 1–4 (2019), https://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/health/Generic_
Drug_Substitution_Laws_32193.pdf (showing support from numerous states for
generic drug substitution).
439. Sarpatwari & Kesselheim, supra note 52.
440. Michael F. Kuzow, The FTC and the Generic Doctrine: A New Rx for
Pharmaceutical Trademarks, 15 TULSA L.J. 327, 343–46 (1979).
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hand, and products, on the other hand, leads to analytical error.441
The likely rejoinder to the thesis of this Article—that the drugs are
the same—reflects this error. Sloppiness about the term “drug” in the
academic literature relating to drug innovation and intellectual
property442 confuses the public and policymakers alike and can lead
to reform proposals that lack a rational basis. It should be shunned,
and it should be corrected whenever possible.

441. See Lietzan, supra note 331, at 811–12 (discussing how this sloppiness
has led to fundamental legal and factual errors in scholarship and policymaking
relating to so-called “evergreening”).
442. See id. at 811–16.

